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TEH D-6/1

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION

April 18, 1960

Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

U. S. Views on the Report of the Military Committee (C/8/D5)

SI

Position Paper

Anticipated Position of Foreign Governments:

1. The member states may be expected to find the Report of the Military Committee agreeable. As it deals with topics on which there are differences of opinion, however, consideration of the Report may give rise to discussion of at least some of these and certainly will on Command Structure.

2. There are two subjects inherent in consideration of the Report which, because of their complexity, are dealt with in separate papers, as follows:

(a) Command Structure - See D-6/2, CENTO Command Structure and Related Questions.

(b) Basic Assumptions for Global War - See D-6/4, Basic Assumptions for Global War.

3. During consideration of the Report discussion of the following matters may occur:

(a) CENTO Liaison with NATO and SEATO

(i) The three regional states favor closer military liaison with NATO and SEATO and will support the request in the Military Committee's report that "the Council...assist the military in expediting, to the extent feasible, the establishment of...necessary liaison between international organizations which are devoted to the same principles."

(ii) Turkey as a member of NATO and Pakistan as a member of SEATO recognize the necessity of working on this matter in unison with their allies in those two organizations.

(b) CMPS

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(b) CMPS Budget

(i) The United Kingdom feels strongly that, in accordance with British constitutional practice, the budget of the Combined Military Planning Staff (CMPS) should be subject to CENTO civil review before being submitted to the Ministerial Council for approval, and that this review should be performed by the Budget and Administration Committee.

(ii) Turkey and Iran are disposed to agree to a procedure which will meet the British objective.

(iii) Pakistan is also disposed to agree, but not to implementation of new procedures until a year hence.

(c) Contingency Planning - See D-6/3, CENTO Military Contingency Planning.

(d) U. S. Military Assistance Program

(i) Despite their limited absorptive capacities, all three regional governments desire increased U. S. military assistance.

(ii) The United Kingdom may be expected to defer to U. S. views in this matter.

(e) Infrastructure

(i) The Middle East member governments favor the establishment of a CENTO "common infrastructure" program. It is unlikely that they could contribute materially to its financing and the United States would be expected to bear most of the cost. There have been indications that the intent of the regional countries is to obtain more British financial support.

(ii) The United Kingdom favors continuation of the present U. S. and U. K. infrastructure support programs on a "national" rather than a "common" basis.

Recommended U. S. Position:

1. The Report of the Military Committee is agreeable.

2. U. S. views on matters which may arise during discussion of the Report are given below:

(a) CENTO Liaison with NATO and SEATO

(i) The United States favors developing military liaison with NATO and SEATO. It should be recognized, however, that political

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problems do exist, especially in NATO, which inevitably bear on the pace of the development of such liaison. It is in CENTO's interest to develop this liaison firmly, on a gradual step-by-step basis rather than to be precipitant.

(ii) If the regional members press for formal action by the Council on this matter, the United States is prepared to undertake in NATO, acting in conjunction with the U. K. and Turkey, and in SEATO acting in conjunction with the U. K. and Pakistan, to bring to the attention of the respective organizations the concern of the CENTO Ministerial Council for some form of liaison as regards exchanges of military information, leaving to representatives of the overlapping CENTO countries in each case discretion as to how and when they may most effectively take this action.

(b) CMPS Budget

(i) The United States believes review of the CMPS Budget by the Budget and Administration Committee would be useful as a means for ensuring greater uniformity in CENTO administration and is prepared to support amendment of CENTO's procedures designed to accomplish this objective, but the United States hopes the FY 1960/61 budget (August 1, 1960-July 31, 1961) can be approved expeditiously.

(ii) Should CMPS budgets in the future include operational military items in addition to the purely administrative items they now contain, the United States believes these are within the exclusive purview of CENTO's military and should not be subject to civil review before being submitted for Ministerial approval.

(c) U. S. Military Assistance Programs

(i) U. S. military assistance programs with the regional member states are developed in close and continuous consultation with them. They have been of substantial magnitude. They have, in our judgment, materially enhanced the defence capabilities of the CENTO states.

(ii) Limited appropriations make it impossible to increase our MAP Programs with the regional states. We shall have to live with the fact that the United States and its partners in the Mutual Security Program are likely to have to do more with less money in the period immediately ahead.

(d) Infrastructure

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(d) Infrastructure

(i) We do not favor the establishment of a CENTO "common infrastructure" program, which would have to be financed largely by the United States. We have agreed, however, to a CENTO Infrastructure Coordinating Committee to develop common standards. We also agree that the CMPS might usefully make a study of existing and required facilities.

Discussion

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Discussion

GENTO Liaison with NATO and SEATO

While the Military Committee's request to the Council for assistance in expediting liaison with NATO and SEATO is not limited specifically to liaison on military matters, the Military Committee's concern in this regard is for exchanges of military information. As regards non-military information, arrangements have been agreed to between CENTO-NATO and CENTO-SEATO for exchanges of such documents up to and including CONFIDENTIAL in political, economic, informational, organizational, and similar fields. In point of fact, however, there have been few actual exchanges in this respect.

As regards military liaison with NATO, CENTO's request was considered by the NATO Council in January 1959, but a final decision was not taken in view of Canadian and Scandinavian reservations. Pursuant to authorization by the NAC, Secretary-General Spaak informed his CENTO colleague that NAC recognizes the mutual benefits of exchanges of information and that NATO military authorities were being asked to recommend what sort of information they thought would be most useful to receive in such exchanges. CENTO has already indicated to NATO the types of military information it would like to receive. Discussion on this subject in a team under the NATO Standing Group has become bogged down over the question of whether the rather limited types of information which NATO is prepared to furnish should be provided to CENTO through a "sponsor nation" acting as an intermediary or should be supplied directly between bodies of the two organizations. This aspect has not yet been resolved.

SEATO's deliberations on CENTO's request for military exchanges has become involved in a consideration of the value to CENTO of SEATO documents classified no higher than CONFIDENTIAL, the upper limit to which SEATO is prepared to agree. While SEATO is continuing its deliberations on this matter, it is not clear whether a decision is imminent.

CMPS Budget

Early in its history CENTO adopted the procedure that the CMPS Budget be prepared by the CMPS in coordination with Budget and Administration Committee and then be submitted directly to the Ministerial Council for approval. In accordance with this procedure the report which the Military

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Committee has placed before the Ministerial Council at Tehran has annexed to it the CMPS Budget for CENTO FY 1960/61 (August 1, 1960-July 31, 1961). The United Kingdom, while having originally agreed to this procedure, has pressed for some time for amended regulations which would be in accord with the British practice that military budgets are subject to civil reviewing authority, which in the case of CENTO would mean review by the Budget and Administrative Committee after preparation by the CMPS. The discussions of this matter have been sporadic and have included such aspects as whether civil review should cover all matters, including operations, or merely administrative matters. In these discussions we have taken the position contained in the recommended U. S. position set forth above.

In the Washington Ministerial Council the British representative's instructions did not permit him to accept the CMPS Budget for CENTO's FY 1959/60, inasmuch as it had not been reviewed by civil authority. Subsequently, the United Kingdom agreed to approval of this budget while maintaining its view that in future years the CMPS Budget should be referred to the Budget and Administration Committee for review before being sent to the Ministerial Council. In consequence, the question of procedures for approving CMPS budgets has been discussed in the ensuing meetings of the Budget and Administration Committee and the Council Deputies. In the Council Deputies meeting of April 7, 1960, the British representative stated that it appeared the United Kingdom would not be able to join in final approval of the CMPS Budget for FY 1960/61 (i.e., the budget annexed to the Report now before the Council) until it had been examined by CENTO civil reviewing authority, and that the United Kingdom intended to raise this question in the Tehran meeting. The Pakistani representative in the April 7 meeting indicated for the first time that his country could now agree to civil review of the CMPS Budget, provided there would be no undue delay jeopardizing execution of military programs, but that this agreement to revised procedures would apply beginning with consideration of the FY 1961/62 budget. In consequence, the issue of civil review appears more nearly resolved but has not yet been disposed of.

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EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION

TEH D-6/2

Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

April 18, 1960

CENTO Command Structure and Related Questions

Position Paper

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Introduction:

Command Structure will be one of the principal issues to arise in the Tehran meeting.

Command Structure was the primary topic considered at the recent meeting of CENTO's Military Committee. The salient issues involved in the Committee's vigorous discussions on this matter were (a) whether the military planners' study of Command Structure, prepared pursuant to the Washington Ministerial Council's directive to study "the problem of the Command Structure", was in adequate shape to be placed before the Tehran meeting of the Council, and (b) whether the decision of the Washington meeting that the Committee should study the question of Command Structure constituted Ministerial agreement in principle to the establishment of such a Structure. On the first aspect (a) the Committee decided to refer the study back to the planners for further review, but the Pakistan representative made clear he regarded this action as totally unnecessary. On the second aspect (b) there was no consensus of views but our representative made clear the Ministers' action did not constitute agreement in principle to the establishment of a Command Structure.

A further development of interest in the Military Committee meeting is that Turkey may have under consideration the commitment to CENTO rather than to NATO of forces in the eastern part of that country; however, the scope and import of Turkey's consideration are not clear.

Closely related to the CENTO Command Structure question is the concept of assigned forces. The Shah's interest in becoming CENTO's military Commander-in-Chief, until recently much mooted, is also related but is now a less prominent factor. These two topics are discussed below jointly with Command Structure.

Anticipated Position of Foreign Governments:

1. Pakistan believes positive steps should be taken without further delay to set up a Command Structure and to assign forces adequate for the defense of the CENTO region. It cannot agree to

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regard CENTO as a flank guard of NATO. In Pakistan's view, the Washington Ministerial Council agreed in principle to the establishment of a CENTO Command Structure. At one point Pakistan agreed privately to support the appointment of the Shah as Commander-in-Chief. While it recently indicated a preference for a U. S. officer or for a regional officer other than Iran's Chief of State, it probably would still accept the Shah.

2. Iran also believes positive steps should be taken without delay to establish a Command Structure and that the Washington Ministerial Council agreed in principle to its creation. In the recent Military Committee meeting, however, Iran took the position that it was necessary to determine what forces would be assigned to the defense of the CENTO area before a Structure could be established. All of Iran's forces would be so assigned. Iran has customarily taken an equivocal position as to the stationing of foreign forces on Iranian soil, because of possible Soviet reaction. The Shah would like to be CENTO's Supreme Commander.

3. Turkey has always supported in principle the establishment of a CENTO Command Structure and now appears to have under review the commitment of forces to CENTO as well as to NATO. In a somewhat contradictory presentation in the recent Military Committee meeting, the Turkish representative stated that in case of global war Turkish forces in the eastern part of Turkey would be under the operational control of CENTO; however, he stated subsequently in the meeting that he could not agree with the concept of offering part of Turkey's forces to NATO and part to CENTO.

4. The United Kingdom, though professing on a political level little enthusiasm for a Command Structure, has vacillated on this subject and would be willing to go along in principle if the United States agreed, but would wish to keep the Structure ultimately created to very modest proportions. The United Kingdom believes the issue of whether to establish such a Structure was conceded at the Washington Ministerial meeting and that a crisis in confidence on the part of the regional members is likely to ensue if some progress is not made in the near future.

Recommended U. S. Position:

1. The United States believes that the creation of a CENTO Command Structure now or in the immediate future would be undesirable for political reasons. The establishment of such a Structure, or announcement of agreement in principle on its creation, would adversely affect Free World interests in the Middle East area by disturbing, without commensurate gain, the relations between the member states and their neighbors.

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2. The United States believes that real military progress can be made by CENTO without establishing a Command Structure. CENTO's military planners should be encouraged to proceed, under the guidance of the Military Committee, with perfecting contingency plans for a Command Structure which would be available on a standby basis if and when the Ministerial Council agrees that such a Structure is needed and is politically desirable. This position is wholly consistent with our agreement with the decision of the Washington Ministerial Council Session "that the problem of the Command Structure should be studied by the Military Committee".

3. The regional members should recognize that the United States has effectively demonstrated its sincere desire to make CENTO a meaningful organization. The question of a Command Structure is only one aspect of CENTO arrangements, and United States unwillingness to participate at this time is dictated by compelling political reasons. It in no way suggests a weakening of U. S. support for CENTO. The United States will continue its strong support of CENTO's defense cooperation, through the Eisenhower Doctrine, bilateral executive agreements, substantial military assistance programs, and participation in CENTO military activities.

4. The United States is not able to assign or earmark forces to CENTO at this time (nor will it be able to furnish increased military assistance, hopes of which would be aroused by creation of the Command Structure).

5. In view of its position on Command Structure, the United States feels that, without prejudice to any particular candidate, there is no need to consider appointment of a Commander-in-Chief.

Discussion:

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Discussion:

Pakistan and Turkey have long favored the establishment of a CENTO Command Structure complete with theater and service headquarters, and Iran now supports this view. Pakistan and Iran believe that a Structure is essential in order to strengthen the military side of CENTO, and have intensified in recent months their pressure to obtain U. S. agreement to such a proposal. Turkey's position is undergoing a review which appears to include consideration of whether forces in eastern Turkey now committed to NATO should be committed to CENTO. One possible interpretation of the contradictory remarks of the Turkish representative in the recent Military Committee meeting is that Turkey could agree only in time of global war to divide its forces between NATO and CENTO commands. If this interpretation of Turkey's position is correct, a possible reason prompting it is that the Turkish authorities may have belatedly concluded to do otherwise would require them to admit publicly NATO's defense planning fails to cover the remote eastern part of Turkey.

An important element in Iran's approach to the problem is the Shah's interest in becoming CENTO's Commander-in-Chief. Until recently, Iran tied its acceptance of the concept of a Structure to agreement to the appointment of the Shah to this position, and it is not unlikely Iran will again assert this condition at a moment it considers more propitious than the present for discussion of the Supreme Commander position. Iran has also intimated that constitutionally Iran's forces could not be placed under a non-Iranian commander.

The United States has been opposed to a Command Structure on the ground it would be both a political and an economic liability. There is no compelling military requirement for its establishment at this time. In addition to our concern over reactions in the Middle East area to its creation, we believe the regional states would use our participation in the Structure as a means for asserting that we support their national positions in intra-area disputes, such as over Shatt-al-Arab and Pashtunistan. We believe that such allegations on their part, however false, would lessen our capability to exercise a moderating influence on the disputants. Furthermore, the establishment of a Command Structure would not solve the basic problems we face in CENTO, such as demands for increased economic and military assistance, a CENTO common infrastructure program, and ultimately the assignment or earmarking of U. S. forces. Indeed, such a Structure would be likely to intensify these pressures.

There is also the matter of whether, in the absence of U. S. adherence to CENTO, the Executive Branch should seek Congressional views or approval as regards U. S. participation in a CENTO Command

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Structure. It is most likely that many of the considerations involved in the question of U. S. adherence to CENTO would also arise in connection with any proposal for the United States to associate itself with a CENTO Command arrangement. (See D-11/1, U. S. Adherence to CENTO.)

The position of the Department of Defense on a CENTO Command Structure is that its establishment would be a logical and legitimate step to which the United States should not be opposed, subject to agreement on the terms of reference involved; however, the question of whether the United States could participate in such a command organization requires consideration of the political factors involved.

The Turkish position appears to us to require clarification, particularly as regards the possible division of Turkish forces between NATO and CENTO commands in time of global war. We are considering whether we should raise this matter bilaterally with the Turks, perhaps during the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Istanbul.

The discussion in the Washington Ministerial Council Session, when it was decided on October 8, 1959, "that the problem of the Command Structure be studied by the Military Committee and the results of its study be placed before the Council at its next meeting", left uncertain in the written record whether the Ministers contemplated the establishment of such a Structure prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The original wording proposed for this decision was to the effect that the problem of the Command Structure in wartime was to be studied, but was amended in the course of a somewhat inconclusive discussion. The Secretary in his conversation with Secretary General Baig on October 6, 1959, was very explicit, however, that the United States was prepared to agree to planning of a Command Structure only on a contingency basis. Clearly, the regional members have chosen to regard the wording adopted as agreement in principle to the establishment of a Structure prior to the outbreak of hostilities; and the United Kingdom is prepared to concede on this point. Our representative in the recent Military Committee meeting, as recorded in the minutes of the Committee's first plenary session on March 28, 1960, "pointed out that this [decision to study the question of the Command Structure] did not mean that the principle of the Command Structure had been accepted."

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TEH D-6/3

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION

April 18, 1960

Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

CENTO Military Contingency Planning

Position Paper

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Anticipated Position of Foreign Governments:

1. Iran is deeply obsessed with the possibility of what it terms Soviet "aggression by proxy" from either Afghanistan or Iraq. It desires CENTO military contingency planning covering these two countries. In view of bilateral discussions of this subject with the United States, however, Iran may not press this point as vigorously in the CENTO forum as heretofore.

2. Pakistan, while less concerned with the Iraqi threat, is disturbed over recent Afghanistan developments. It, too, favors military contingency planning covering Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, India. It would be willing to go along with similar planning for Iraq.

3. Turkey, whose relations with Afghanistan and Iraq are reasonably good, does not favor CENTO military contingency planning against either of these states at this time. It will, however, probably support the position taken by Iran and Pakistan.

4. The United Kingdom has favored CENTO military contingency planning covering Afghanistan and Iraq, but has thus far deferred to U. S. views in this matter. It has acknowledged there is no immediate military need for this, but feels it would bolster Iranian and Pakistani morale. It does not want such planning extended to India.

Recommended U. S. Position:

1. The United States firmly believes that CENTO military contingency planning for Afghanistan or Iraq is politically undesirable and is not militarily necessary at this time. The United States has not written off Afghanistan or Iraq as Soviet satellites.

2. The United States does not consider as likely Soviet-inspired aggression from the uncommitted countries in the CENTO region, Afghanistan or Iraq in particular.

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3. Knowledge of such CENTO contingency planning--which is bound to leak out--would be interpreted throughout the Middle East as attempted CENTO military involvement in intra-area disputes. As such, it will increase already existing area suspicions of CENTO, which have of late shown some signs of abating. It could also disrupt the delicate balance now obtaining in Afghanistan and Iraq and drive these states closer to the Soviet camp. Any such development is not in the free world's interest.

4. While Afghan and Iraqi willingness to take Soviet arms delivery is to be deplored, the United States does not believe that either of these states is likely to possess any real military capability to employ these arms for serious aggression against a CENTO state for some time to come.

5. The United States agrees that the situation in both of these states requires close and continuous watching. It is prepared to exchange with its CENTO friends, preferably on the political level, assessments of developments in these countries.

6. The United States readily understands, however, that the military planners of the regional states may have to envisage tensions flowing from disputes with neighbors and in which the element of Communist subversion cannot be clearly demonstrated. Such planning, although understandable, does not fall within the ambit of U. S. support of CENTO and cannot be supported by the United States. U. S. world-wide responsibilities demand that it keep its energies focused on clearly demonstrated Communist threats. This decision is subject to reconsideration if the political situation in either of these countries were so to alter that the United States is persuaded a major Communist threat emanates from them.

7. The United States considers that the United Nations is the proper forum in which to deal with strictly localized disputes.

8. The United States has amply demonstrated in the past, e.g., Taiwan, Lebanon, etc., that it will take appropriate action, both inside and outside the United Nations, in cases of direct aggression.

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~~EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION~~

TEH D-8/1

Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

April 18, 1960

U. S. Views on the Report of the  
Counter-Subversion Committee (C/S/D2)

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Position Paper

Anticipated Position of Foreign Governments:

1. The Report of the Counter-Subversion Committee (C/S/D2) may be expected to be satisfactory.
2. The United Kingdom may propose that CENTO place more emphasis on attributable public relations activities and suggest that this should be accomplished through merging the activities of the Public Relations Division and the Counter-Subversion Office.
3. The three regional states may again express their feeling of frustration with the lack of accomplishments by the Counter-Subversion Office.

Recommended U. S. Position:

1. The Report of the Counter-Subversion Committee is acceptable.
2. The resolution recommended to the Council is acceptable.
3. If the United Kingdom discusses a possible merger of the Counter-Subversion Office and the Public Relations Division:
  - a. We believe past experience has demonstrated adequately the wisdom of handling separately, on the one hand, the production of publicity attributed directly to CENTO and, on the other hand, the production and placement of unattributed information, which requires optimum co-ordination and security arrangements.
  - b. We are willing nonetheless to defer adopting a position on this matter until action is taken on proposals which are expected to arise from the Iranian submission to the CSC for a reorientation of CSO efforts.
4. The United States has noted with satisfaction Iranian initiative in suggesting a basis for developing a realistic approach to the role of the CSO. We look forward to seeing the study which the CSO has been directed to prepare on the basis of the Iranian paper.

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5. As necessary and appropriate, the following observations may be made:

a. While the United States is in full agreement that all subversive threats to CENTO states require careful watching, it believes that the CSO effort should be focused on meeting the Communist and Communist-inspired ~~subversive~~ threats to the CENTO region.

b. We feel that no changes in CSO organization, administration or procedures, including recruitment of additional personnel for authorized but unfunded positions, should be made until after the CSO has commented on the Iranian proposal.

Discussion:

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Discussion:

The Counter-Subversion Committee (CSC), operating through a permanent working group in the CENTO organization, namely the Counter-Subversion Office (CSO), has the responsibility for planning effective counter-subversion programs in the CENTO region. It has a broad charter which enables it to consider and recommend action designed to counter the Communist subversive threat.

The CSO consists of an international staff of 11 persons (13 positions authorized and funded) and five national secretaries (one from each nation). The head of the CSO is the Deputy Secretary General (Counter-Subversion), who also serves as the national secretary from Iran. This office is charged with the detailed planning of programs as directed by the CSC. The United States pays 20 percent of the CSO operational budget. In FY 1959/60 the U. S. share of the \$ 39,740 budget included unused funds carried over from past USIA and CIA support.

The CSO programs to date have been of limited value. This has been particularly true since Iraq's withdrawal from CENTO (then the Baghdad Pact) in July, 1958, but the disruption caused by this development now appears to be subsiding and a more realistic approach seems to be developing on the part of the member nations. It is recognized that the activities of an international organization of the CSO type are necessarily of limited scope.

The regional states' criticism of the CSO is typified by the comments in the Iranian paper entitled "Suggestion About the Aim, Function and Organization of the Counter-Subversion Office" (Annex A to C/8/B2). This paper states that the feeling which prompted its preparation is "one of frustration and uneasiness". It adds that, "compared to the importance and the immensity of the task, the outcome of our common efforts has been so slight that we have to consider them as practically ineffectual . . . the Counter-Subversion Office has quite a sizeable organization, including a number of highly qualified men, and involving important expenses. That so much energy and money should be dissipated for so little result is indeed disquieting."

Although basically in agreement with the above criticism, the United States for some time has not been in full agreement with the regional states on what should be the scope of CSO activities. At least some of the regional states, while recognizing the Communist threat, feel that they are more threatened by their neighboring states, e.g., India, Afghanistan, Iraq. Consequently, while they may talk in terms of "Communist-inspired" subversion, they actually wish the CSO to

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address itself to these allegedly more immediate threats. Consistent with our reasons for associating with CENTO activities, the United States has felt that the counter-subversion program should focus exclusively on meeting the Communist and Communist-inspired subversive threats. We have been concerned lest CSO activities in regional states could redound to CENTO's disadvantage as well as create problems for us in our relations with other regional states. To date, we have been able to focus CSO attention on the Communist threat as the principal menace to the Treaty area. We propose to maintain these concepts in establishing our position on the Iranian paper.

The resolution "Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against Iran", which the CSC recommends in its Report to the Council (C/8/D2), is prompted by Iranian concern over intensified Soviet propaganda activity which had continued since the Council's Washington meeting in October 1959. At that time the Council took note of the Soviet campaign and issued a declaration, together with its final communique, which deplored the Soviet's propaganda activities. The recommended resolution is generally in line with the 1959 declaration. It contains the added point, however, relating to the "constructive measures being undertaken by the Iranian authorities to develop social well-being and a sound economy in Iran." This was included primarily because of injured Iranian sensibilities resulting from U. S. press comment critical of Iran. (See position paper on Soviet Pressures on Iran.) Assuming the Council approves the CSC's Report, this resolution may be expected not to give rise to further comment.

The proposed text of a communique on the Pushtunistan (Pakhtoonistan) dispute, included in the Report to the Council, is not likely to require action by the Council in the context of considering the CSC Report. Pakistan is most likely to raise this issue in a restricted Council session. (See position paper on Afghan-Pakistan Relations.)

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TEH D-11/5

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION  
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

April 18, 1960

Position Paper

Afghan-Iran Relations  
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)

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Anticipated Iranian Position

There is considerable concern on the part of Iran over developments in the internal and external policies of Afghanistan. This concern is based on (1) evidence of substantial Soviet economic and military aid programs in Afghanistan which might pose a threat to Iran and (2) the expressed Afghan desire to construct a new dam on the lower Helmand River which could divert waters presently flowing into Iran.

Iran has taken the position that, as a nation committed to free world defense arrangements, the countries with which she is aligned should support her in her concern over potential military and economic threats from Afghanistan. Specifically, Iran would like our support for (1) CENTO military planning based on the contingency of Soviet-inspired aggression from Afghanistan; (2) economic and military assistance which is greater than Soviet aid to Afghanistan in relation to the size of the two recipient countries; and (3) the Iranian position on the Helmand River controversy.

Recommended U.S. Position

1. While we have serious reservations concerning the policy of Afghanistan in accepting large amounts of Soviet economic and military aid, we do not feel that such aid has resulted in Soviet domination of that country, nor do we believe that Afghanistan possesses the military potential to pose an immediate threat to Iran. The rulers of Afghanistan seem determined to preserve their country's independence and territorial integrity.

2. If the matter of contingency planning is raised, we should indicate we do not consider as likely Soviet-inspired aggression from the uncommitted countries in the CENTO region or from Afghanistan (or Iraq) in particular. We therefore do not believe CENTO should engage in planning on the contingency of Soviet-inspired aggression from these areas. Furthermore, if such planning were to come to the attention of the Afghans the effect might be to weaken their own determination to stay out of the Soviet camp. (See D-6/3, CENTO Military Contingency Planning)

3. The United States, as well as the CENTO countries, has an important interest in preserving Afghanistan from Soviet domination. This interest can best be furthered, in our view, by continuing a policy of friendship and conciliation on the Helmand River and other questions plaguing bilateral relations.

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Discussion

Soviet Presence in Afghanistan

The Soviet Union, since 1954, has granted large-scale economic and military assistance, including advisors and equipment, to Afghanistan. Afghanistan ranks fifth among recipients of Soviet bloc aid in terms of total magnitude and among the foremost recipients of such aid in per capita terms, having accepted approximately \$300 million in loans and 90,000 tons of wheat.

Included within this aid program is an \$80 million all-weather road from the Soviet border at Kushka to Kandahar; this project is being financed either by a grant or a long-term, low-interest loan. Concern has been expressed by Iran and Pakistan that this road, near both of their borders, might be utilized as an avenue for military operations.

Despite considerable penetration in the economic and military fields, the ideological impact of the Soviets has been limited. Local communist activity is prohibited and contacts between the populace and Soviet technicians have been restricted, apparently by mutual desire.

American Assistance to Afghanistan

The United States has made about \$150 million available in grants and loans, including 140,000 tons of wheat, to Afghanistan. This assistance has contributed to good Afghan-American relations and provided some offset to Soviet influence. American efforts have been concentrated in the fields of education, irrigation and communications (including surface and air transport).

Helmand River Dispute

Iran and Afghanistan have a long-standing disagreement over the use of the waters of the Helmand River which rises in central Afghanistan, flows through Iran and ends in Afghanistan in an internal drainage basin. A Neutral Commission, established through American good offices in 1950, made a thorough study of the matter but the two sides have not yet been able to agree to the Commission's conclusions as to an equitable distribution of the waters. The principal issue is the rate of flow to be provided to Iran; the Afghans have considered 22 cubic meters per second to represent traditional Iranian uses whereas the Iranians are seeking a higher rate.

Prime Minister Daud of Afghanistan visited Tehran for three days in March 1960, reportedly bringing new proposals for settlement of the Helmand waters problem; these proposals reportedly provided that Iran would receive

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a rate of water flow of 26 cubic meters per second. The Prime Minister was well received by the Iranians and it was hoped that agreement could be reached. Since the Shah reportedly was not prepared to accept a rate of flow less than 30 to 36 cubic meters per second, however, agreement was not realized. Iranian Prime Minister Eqbal plans to visit Kabul in the near future and will probably continue discussions on this question.

Afghanistan has requested the United States for funds to be utilized in construction of a diversion dam in the lower valley of the Helmand. We have informed both Iran and Afghanistan that the United States Government is prepared to consider sympathetically assistance to both countries in surveying development needs of the lower Helmand and subsequently in examining possibilities of furthering those projects which might be indicated as desirable by such surveys, but only if the two governments first reach at least provisional agreement regarding use of the Helmand waters. There is some evidence that the Afghans may seek Soviet financial assistance for the dam if American aid is not forthcoming.

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TEH D-11/7

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION  
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

April 18, 1960

Position Paper

Soviet Pressures on Iran  
(To be raised only at foreign initiative)

31

Anticipated Iranian Position

Since February 1959 Iran has been subjected to subversive pressures and an abusive campaign of propaganda by the Soviets. This campaign personally insults Iranian leaders, calls for the overthrow of the Iranian government and charges that Iran's ties to CENTO and the western powers betray the interests of the Iranian people. The Soviets began the campaign when the Iranians rejected Soviet attempts to come to an accommodation with Iran, and Iran decided to strengthen its ties to the U.S. by concluding the Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation. The Soviets have clearly indicated that they would relax their pressures on Iran and even provide aid to Iran if Iran would shift toward a neutral security policy. Iran has rejected these Soviet approaches.

While other pro-Western countries increasingly engage in exchanges with the Soviets and neutralist countries seek the benefits of aid from both the USSR and the West, Iran resists Soviet pressures with only limited assurances of support and insufficient material aid from the Free World. Iran hopes that the U.S. and CENTO powers will support Iran's stand against Soviet attacks in a more effective manner.

Recommended U.S. Position

The U.S. and Iran's CENTO partners have shown their clear support for Iran in the face of these unwarranted and hostile Soviet pressures. At the Washington Ministerial Meeting last fall the CFNTO declaration of support for Iran against Soviet propaganda forcefully stated the Organization's position. The White House Statement following Prime Minister Eqbal's call on the President at the conclusion of the Washington meeting emphasized the U.S. position of support for Iran against Soviet threats. U.S. support for Iran against Soviet pressures was reiterated by the President on March 23, 1960, on the occasion of receiving Ambassador Zahedi. We support the resolution recommended to the Ministerial Council in the Report of the Counter Subversion Committee (see position paper D-8/1) concerning action to be taken in consequence of Soviet propaganda attacks on Iran.

We continue to believe that hostile propaganda should cease before correct relations can be considered to exist between the USSR and Iran. We also appreciate Iran's posture of polite firmness in dealing with Soviet threats and blandishments. While Soviet threats can never be discounted, we have no evidence that the USSR intends to invade Iran. With the assurances noted above and the aid which is possible within the limitations of Free World resources, Iran can be confident that its courageous insistence upon determining its own policies in the face of the Soviet campaign has won international respect.

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Discussion

Origin and Nature of Soviet Pressures on Iran

In January 1959 the Shah, in a period of disappointment with the extent of U.S. military and economic aid, invited a Soviet delegation to Tehran to discuss the possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR. Because of the intransigence of the Soviet negotiators and warnings from the U.S., U.K., Turks and Pakistanis of the possible consequences, the Iranians broke off the negotiations on February 11, 1959. This breaking-off of negotiations and the conclusion on March 5, 1959, of the Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with the U.S. over Soviet protests angered the Soviets. Khrushchev indicated Soviet outrage that the USSR had been rebuffed by the weak Iranians. In this atmosphere the Soviet propaganda campaign was launched.

Radio broadcasts in Persian began on February 25, 1959, with a Khrushchev speech comparing the Shah's regime to that of the recently deposed Iraqi government. Bloc transmitters and a clandestine "National Voice of Iran" operating from the Soviet Caucasus vilify the Shah and other Iranian leaders, call upon the Iranian people to overthrow their government and charge that Iranian association with CENTO and the West is a betrayal of Iran's national interests. East German stations regularly call for the reorganization of the outlawed Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran into an instrument of subversion.

At the outset of this campaign, the Soviets may have expected to bring about the collapse of the Iranian government. As it became apparent that no such immediate result would occur, the Soviets gave indications to the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow that they might call off their propaganda campaign and even give aid to Iran if the Iranians lessened their cooperation with the West and made conciliatory gestures toward the USSR. The Shah privately told the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran that he would give a written assurance that he would not permit foreign missile bases in Iran in peacetime but insisted that Iran would otherwise choose its own course in domestic and international affairs. The Soviets have not considered this offer a sufficient basis for terminating their pressures on Iran. Most recently, the Indian Ambassador in Tehran has hinted that if the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Moscow, a high-ranking Soviet official might then visit Tehran and relations might thereby be improved. Nothing has come of this to date.

Current Iranian Attitudes

Soviet broadcasts have an irritating effect on the Iranians who are always sensitive to criticism and historically aware of the power and designs of their northern neighbor. The Iranians are particularly dismayed when Soviet commentators cite criticisms of Iran in the U.S. press. To some extent the Soviet campaign is offset by Iranian boredom with repetitious abuse, but it inevitably contributes to a continuing sense of uneasiness on the part of most Iranians.

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Iran also sees signs of increasing contacts between the West and the USSR while Iran continues to come under Soviet fire. The Summit talks, the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits and the proposed Menderes-Khrushchev visits give rise among Iranians to speculations that a Soviet detente with the West would ignore Iran's interests. It is possible that in this atmosphere Iranian Foreign Minister Aram will be sent to Moscow to discuss means of bettering Iran's relations with the USSR.

U.S. and CENTO Support of Iran

So far, the existence of CENTO and U.S. aid and assurances have stiffened the Iranians' resolve not to bow to Soviet pressures. Our Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation, CENTO and U.S. declarations last fall and the President's visit to Iran in December 1959 highlighted to the Iranians the considerable moral and material support they have received from the U.S. against Soviet threats. Most recently the President said on receiving the new Iranian Ambassador on March 23, 1960:

"You have mentioned your Government's decision to abandon its traditional policy of neutrality and to cooperate with the United States in its struggle to preserve the independence and integrity of the nations of the free world. You have found that this cooperation has brought down upon Iran a barrage of vicious and unwarranted propaganda. You may be assured that you do not stand alone in the face of these hostile pressures. I am more confident than ever that the cause of freedom and peace with justice which we share shall inevitably triumph. Men in all nations aspire to this goal, as they have found from the dawn of history."

A further CENTO resolution concerning action to be taken in consequence of Soviet propaganda attacks on Iran, which we intend to support, has been proposed in the Counter Subversion Committee (see position paper D-8/1). It can be expected, however, that U.S. and CENTO will be called upon to support Iran against Soviet pressures vigorously until there is a genuine change in current Soviet attitudes towards Iran.

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Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

TEN R-II/1

April 15, 1960

Background PaperTurkeyPOLITICAL

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Summary

The Democrat Party, headed by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, is currently in power in Turkey. The principal opposition party is the Republican People's Party under Ismet Inonu. Both parties support Turkey's anti-Russian, anti-neutralist, pro-NATO, pro-UN and pro-U.S. policies. The Cyprus agreements have improved Greek-Turkish relations. Turkey distrusts Nasser but supports Qasim as the only alternative to either Communism or chaos in Iraq. Turkish foreign policy is deeply committed to the alliance, through CENTO, with Iran and Pakistan. Turkey feels that the West must concentrate on bolstering the will and determination of the Shah to resist Soviet pressures. Turkey is suspicious of the USSR, and even though a Khrushchev-Menderes meeting may take place, there is little doubt that the GOT will be cautious in its relations with the Soviets.

Domestic Turkish Politics

The Democrat Party, founded in 1946 by dissidents in the Government, including Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and Refik Koraltan, was initially elected to power in 1950 in the first completely free elections in Turkish history, defeating the Republican People's Party under Ismet Inonu, the political heir of Kemal Ataturk. Re-elected in 1954 by an overwhelming majority and again in 1957 with a plurality (43%), though not a majority, of the popular vote, Menderes' administration currently holds 409 of the 610 seats in the unicameral legislature, the Grand National Assembly. The opposition Republican People's Party's strength in the 1957 elections is not reflected in the 174 seats it presently holds. Of the remaining seats, 22 are vacant, three are held by the Republican Peasant Nation Party and two by independents.

Indications point to the likelihood that the Menderes administration may hold legislative elections this year although they would not normally be due until the autumn of 1961. (The Turkish Constitution sanctions either time.) Latest estimates continue to give Menderes' administration a slight edge in popular support.

The opposition has consistently criticized the Menderes administration for its economic policies and its conduct of elections. Now that the economy is less of an issue, the principal opposition criticism of Menderes is directed at repressions of freedom of speech, freedom of press and political assembly. The opposition RPP has occasionally taken the point of view that the United States supports the DP. (In fact, assistance to Turkey was begun in 1947 when the RPP was in office.)

Foreign

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Foreign policy has not constituted a serious issue in Turkish politics over the past decade. The RPP supports Turkey's anti-Russian, anti-Neutralist, pro-NATO, pro-UN, and pro-U.S. policies. Inonu recently affirmed his party's support of these policies and of CENTO. The RPP traditionally does not favor alliance with the Arab nations.

Greece and Cyprus

The Cyprus agreements have improved Greek-Turkish relations in general and within NATO in particular, and Turkey and Greece have resumed close collaboration in other fields of mutual interest, especially concerning tactics in the OEEC.

Since the Zurich-London agreements, Turkey's statesmen have tended to view the Cyprus issue in optimistic terms. They have maintained that the interested parties alone achieved the Zurich-London agreements and the same parties can resolve the lesser problems. The GOT, interested in obtaining an early final solution to the Cyprus problem, adopted a policy of support for the British position, largely in the hope that such a united front would force the Cypriot Greeks to come to terms.

Relations with the Arab States and Israel

Turkish leaders insist their policy is one of friendship for all Arab nations, even for those which do not appear to be aware of the threat of Communist infiltration. They also deny any desire to interfere in the affairs of the Arab states through CENTO. Despite this, the Government of Turkey has demonstrated an attitude of extreme distrust toward Nasser, the Turks being convinced that the spread of Nasserism can only lead to further Communist subversion in the Arab countries. (Turkey seems to have a fear that Greater Arabia would be easy prey to Communist subversion. A strong United Arab World on its southern and eastern borders would not contribute to Turkey's sense of security--particularly if that Greater Arabia were to continue its neutralist, anti-Western bent.) Even Nasser's periodic anti-Communist attitudes are viewed by the Turks as mere tactical maneuvers. Turk-UAR relations in the immediate future are likely to continue cool.

The Turkish Government has diligently strived to maintain good relations with the Qasim Government in Iraq, and has tried to impress the United States Government and other Western powers with the thesis that the West has no other choice than to support Qasim. (The alternatives to the Qasim regime are declared to be either Communism or chaos.) Given sufficient support by the West, the Turks aver, Qasim would not need to rely on domestic Communists or external support from the Soviets and could then afford to moderate his antagonism toward the West.

Turkish relations with Israel are cordial and are carried on in the spirit of mutual cooperation even though Turkey has not yet agreed to an exchange of ministers, who were withdrawn at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956.

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Iran and Pakistan

Turkish foreign policy is deeply committed to the alliance, through CENTO, with Iran and Pakistan. The GOT feels that in view of Iran's geographic isolation from the West and of her proximity to the USSR, and hence her vulnerability to Soviet pressure, the West must concentrate on bolstering the will and determination of the Shah to resist Soviet pressures and honor Iran's alliances with CENTO and the West. Turkey has diligently cultivated her relation with Iran to this end and seems to enjoy a considerable degree of Iranian confidence. The Turks, who pressed Iran and Pakistan to conclude bilateral defense agreements with the U.S. in early 1959, have also been urging more British as well as U.S. aid to regional members through CENTO. Turkey in the role of peacemaker in the area has contributed to the thaw in Iraq-Iranian relations and has displayed an interest in aiding Pakistan and Afghanistan reach a satisfactory solution of their border disputes.

Afghanistan

Turkey is eager to employ its historical position of influence in Afghanistan to shore up the Afghan's ability to resist Soviet pressures. Since 1921, Turkey has maintained a military training group in Afghanistan, and Afghans (in varying numbers) have trained in Turkish military schools. The Government of Turkey, in close collaboration with the United States, is working to increase these training facilities. The GOT has appointed a young, able career Ambassador to Kabul, a post which was vacant for some time, and it is expected his appointment will result in more vigorous Turkish efforts to make use of their traditional ties with Afghanistan in countering Soviet penetration there.

Balkan Pact

The Turkish Government has not shown any lively interest in suggestions that--now that Greek-Turkish relations are on an amicable footing--the Balkan Pact linking Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia should be revitalized. Turkey apparently prefers to deal with Yugoslavia on a bilateral basis in most fields.

Relations with the Soviet Bloc

Turkey's attitude toward the USSR is one of deep, abiding suspicion. The Turks are convinced that recent Soviet tactics are designed to create an atmosphere in which Communism can penetrate the capitalist world, with the ultimate aim of world domination. The Turkish Foreign Minister has indicated that formal Soviet approaches for a Khrushchev-Menderes meeting have been made and that an exchange of visits will take place in July. In any event, there is little doubt that the GOT will be cautious in its relations with the Soviets and will insist on evidences of genuine quid pro quo for any relaxation in its attitude.

ECONOMIC

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ECONOMIC

Summary

In August, 1958 Turkey announced a stabilization program, a far-reaching series of measures designed to restore stability to the economy which had become badly unbalanced. In this undertaking Turkey received substantial assistance from the OEEC, IMF and the U.S. Although significant progress has been made by the Turks in dampening inflationary pressures and improving the balance of payments position, none has been made with respect to the vital function of planning and coordinating investment. There are prospects now, however, that with assistance from the Ford Foundation and Dutch economists, the Turks may begin to deal seriously with the investment problem. It is possible that a second multilateral effort will be made this year to provide reinforcement of the stabilization program.

Stabilization Program

Since August 4, 1958, when the Turkish Government announced its intention of pursuing a comprehensive stabilization program, the United States and other foreign governments as well as the IMF and OEEC, all of whom participated in the stabilization program, have tended to appraise the Turkish economy largely in terms of the progress made toward realization of fundamental objectives included in it. The basic objectives of this program were: (1) halting inflation; (2) improvement of a seriously deteriorated balance of payments position; and (3) the formulation of an investment program and the establishment of appropriate Government machinery to coordinate this program.

Since the announcement of the stabilization program, Turkey has succeeded in making considerable progress towards attainment of some of these objectives. There has been an abatement of inflationary pressures and a very marked improvement in its balance of payments position in 1959. However, there has been virtually no progress made in investment planning and coordination.

Investment Planning and Coordination

The United States was able to interest the Ford Foundation in examining the feasibility of its assisting Turkey in the investment field. The Foundation has discussed this matter with the GOT which was quite agreeable to receiving Foundation assistance but no decisions have as yet been made. Present indications are that the Foundation will furnish a small number of advisers to help train Turkish economists to carry on the planning function. Also, the Turkish Government, on its own, has arranged for two Dutch economists to come to Turkey to advise it on the preparation of an investment program. Thus, it is conceivable that in the latter part of 1960 the Turkish Government may take some steps to begin overcoming a serious deficiency in its own organization.

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The 1960 Budget and Elections

Although the 1959 budget was balanced, the 1960 budget is believed to have considerable inflationary potential. The inclusion in the 1960 budget of sizeable expenditures for essentially unproductive and largely welfare-type programs has added to speculation about the possibility of elections in the spring of 1960, and has given rise to uneasiness that the Turkish Government might relax its adherence to the stabilization program. Certain departures from this comprehensive program will probably have to be anticipated if elections are held.

German Assistance

The Turkish Government has continued to seek additional foreign assistance from non-U.S. sources, and after an abortive attempt to obtain funds from the OEEC in November, 1959, it concentrated its efforts on the Federal Republic of Germany. Embassy Ankara has reported that an agreement with the Germans was concluded in early April, 1960, under which the Federal Republic would furnish a five year credit of \$35 million and export credit guarantees of \$15 million, also on five year terms.

Turkey and OEEC

At the end of March, 1960 the Board of Management of the European Monetary Authority examined material presented by Turkish representatives which described Turkey's current economic situation. The Turks did not request financial assistance but confined themselves to a presentation of their situation and generally, to repairing their relations with OEEC. Relations between the two parties had deteriorated after OEEC had rejected the Turks' request for assistance in November, 1959.

It has been reported that the general feeling at the end of the March session was that a second effort to reinforce the stabilization program may be necessary. It is anticipated that OEEC may join with IMF in sending a mission to Turkey in June. IMF and OEEC will consider furnishing additional assistance at that time if they receive firm Turkish commitments to pursue the stabilization objectives.

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Biographic Information Division

ALLEN, Sir Roger

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Roger Allen has been British Ambassador to Greece since April 1957. His rather rapid rise in the Foreign Service is generally attributed to his competence and intelligence, as well as to the respect and friendship which he has earned from his colleagues. Sir Roger entered the Foreign Office in 1940 as a temporary employee, but transferred to the career service in 1946, a few months before he was assigned to Moscow. He remained in Moscow until 1949, and then returned to the Foreign Office to become Head of the United Nations (Political) Department. As Head of the African Department during 1950-53, Allen was intimately concerned with the early Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning the Canal Zone base, and also with questions relating to the Sudan, Libya, Eritrea, and North Africa. In 1953 he was promoted to the rank of Assistant Under Secretary of State, and a year later went to Bonn as U.K. Deputy High Commissioner. At the Foreign Office Allen demonstrated both realism and flexibility in handling problems. He was willing to cooperate whole-heartedly with the United States, but did not unquestioningly follow any line proposed by U.S. representatives. Sir Roger attended the fourth session of the UNGA in New York in 1949.

Born in England in 1909, Allen was educated at Repton and at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in 1937. He married Jocelyn de Kantzow in 1954; they have a son and a daughter. His honors include C.M.G. (1950) and K.C.M.G. (1957).

In appearance, Sir Roger is small but well built. He has a lively sense of humor and a friendly manner. An eminently practical man, he is averse to cant and arguments based on theoretical considerations, and approaches political questions with directness and candor.

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April 1960

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Biographic Information Division

BURROWS, Sir Bernard Alexander Brocas

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Bernard Burrows arrived in Ankara late in 1958 to take up his duties as British Ambassador to Turkey. A member of the British foreign service since 1934, he is primarily an expert on the Middle East. From 1953 to November 1958 Burrows served as Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and earlier in his career spent seven years in Cairo. As head of the Eastern Department in the Foreign Office from 1947 to 1950, he was directly concerned with Arab affairs, and when he was transferred to Washington in 1950 he was given the task of explaining his government's policies in the Middle East to American officials. Early in his career Burrows gained the reputation of being a promising and responsible officer who would go far, and his rapid advancement in the service has justified this prediction. He is extremely intelligent, capable and hard-working, and has shown marked administrative ability in his several posts. While a strong and firm defender of his government's policies at the conference table, he is considered basically friendly toward the United States and has cooperated with American officials within the limits prescribed by his official position.

Born in 1910, Bernard Burrows was educated at Eton and at Trinity College, Oxford. He entered the diplomatic service in 1934, and after several years in the Foreign Office was assigned to Cairo in 1937. Granted an allowance for his knowledge of Arabic in 1939, Burrows remained in Cairo until 1944 when he returned to the Foreign Office to work for several years on German affairs. His appointment as head of the Eastern Department in 1947 brought him back to Middle East problems. Burrows served as Counselor and Head of Chancery at the British Embassy in Washington from 1950 to 1953, and then went to the Persian Gulf as Political Resident, a post which carries ambassadorial rank. He was created C.M.G. in 1950, and K.C.M.G. in 1955.

Tall and distinguished in appearance, Sir Bernard is apt to give an initial impression of stiffness and imperturbability. His reserve is undoubtedly due in some measure to his adherence to the traditional British diplomatic manner, but it probably arises in larger part from a natural shyness. Although he does not show much warmth of feeling, he is pleasant enough socially and can become quite friendly on further acquaintance. Burrows married Inez Carmen Walter in 1944, and has a son and a daughter. Lady Burrows is a daughter of John Walter, who is a Chief Proprietor of the London Times, and a direct descendant of the man who founded the paper in 1785. Lady Burrows is somewhat younger than her husband. In contrast to him, she is animated and informal, and makes friends easily.

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Biographic Information Division

FRASER, Air Marshal Henry Paterson

UNITED KINGDOM

Air Marshal Fraser became the U.K. representative on the Permanent Military Deputies Group of CENTO when it was established on January 1, 1960, and during 1959 served as Director of the R.A.F. Exercise Planning. A South African, Fraser came to England in 1926 to study engineering at Cambridge University. He was president of the University Air Squadron, and after his graduation in 1929 he was given a permanent commission in the R.A.F. and assigned to the Afghan border of India. At the outbreak of World War II he was stationed at the Air Ministry; in 1941 he was put in command of the Experimental Flying Section of the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough where from 1934 to 1938 he had served with the Aerodynamic Flight and in recognition of his work there had been awarded the Air Force Cross in 1937. In 1942 he went to the United States as a member of the R.A.F. delegation in Washington and later that year returned to the Air Ministry to be Deputy Director of War Organization. When the war in Europe ended he was given command of the Airplane and Armament Experimental Establishment at Boscombe Down. He was appointed Deputy Director of Policy (Air Staff) at the Air Ministry in 1957, and during 1948-51 he was a member of the Defense Research Policy Staff. Other important appointments include Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (1954-56) and Air Officer Commanding, No. 12 Group, Fighter Command (1956-58). Air Marshal Fraser was awarded the C.B. in 1953. He is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society.

Air Marshal Fraser was born in 1907, the son of the late Harry Fraser, a mining magnate in Johannesburg. He attended St. Andrew's College, Grahamstown, South Africa before finishing his education in England. He married Avis Gertrude Haswell in 1932; they have two sons. After his retirement from the R.A.F., Air Marshal Fraser may return to South Africa with his family.

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Biographic Information Division

HARRISON, Sir Geoffrey Wedgwood

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Geoffrey Harrison was appointed British Ambassador to Iran in November 1958, and before this post served as Ambassador to Brazil during 1956-58. An able diplomat with wide experience, Harrison entered the Foreign Service in 1932. His early overseas posts included Tokyo (1935-37); Berlin (1937-September 1939); and Brussels (1945-47). In 1947-49 he was assigned to Moscow with the rank of minister, and on his return to the Foreign Office in the latter year he became Head of the Northern Department (Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). In 1951 he was promoted to Assistant Under Secretary of State, and until his departure for Brazil in 1956 he directed European operations in the Foreign Office. During this period he attended a number of important international conferences, notably the 1954 Berlin conference and the July 1955 Summit conference; he acquitted himself particularly well in the Trieste negotiations in 1953-54. Harrison visited the United States in 1951 on official business.

While at the Foreign Office during 1949-56, Harrison became well known to American Embassy officials. An effective negotiator, he presented the British position with marked ability, and though he gave an initial impression of slyness, he proved to be completely reliable. As a result of his Moscow experience, Harrison seemed to be more aware than most British officials of the actual nature of the Soviet regime. While his acceptance of Anglo-American solidarity is based on what is best for Great Britain, he has a great admiration for the United States, and demonstrated an extremely friendly and cooperative attitude toward U.S. officials in London.

Of pleasant appearance and above medium height, Sir Geoffrey has a sophisticated and polished, if occasionally somewhat official, manner. He is very quick and intelligent, and appears completely relaxed and at home in any situation. Born in 1908, Harrison was educated at Winchester and at King's College, Cambridge. He was married in 1936 to Amy Clive, the daughter of Sir Robert Clive who was British Ambassador to Japan when Harrison was serving there. The Harrisons have three sons and one daughter. Sir Geoffrey was awarded the C.M.G. in 1949 and the K.C.M.G. in 1955. He has a knowledge of Japanese.

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April 1960

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Biographic Information Division

LLOYD, Selwyn

UNITED KINGDOM

Selwyn Lloyd was first appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in December 1955 during the premiership of Sir Anthony Eden, and retained the same portfolio in the cabinets formed by Prime Minister Macmillan in January 1957 and October 1959. Closely identified with Eden's Suez policy, Lloyd became a prime target of the Labor opposition after 1956, while his lack of a personal political following and national standing made him a scapegoat within his own party. Macmillan, however, has given him unstinting and loyal support, publicly denying on several occasions that he intended to replace his Foreign Secretary. During 1959 Lloyd's stature in the House of Commons steadily rose, and his performance at the Foreign Ministers' conference at Geneva in May-August 1959 greatly increased his reputation throughout the country. Lloyd admits to differences with the American administration from time to time, but is convinced that the Anglo-American alliance is of supreme importance for the future of the free world.

Although not an impressive public figure, Lloyd has excellent technical abilities; his command of facts and details and capacity for hard work have won him the respect of his Foreign Office staff. A successful barrister before assuming ministerial office, he presents a case incisively and cogently. He is a master of committee work, disentangling arguments and summarizing conclusions with ease, particularly on such complex subjects as disarmament. First elected to Parliament in 1945, Lloyd's political rise was rapid, due partly to Eden's sponsorship. He served as Minister of State at the Foreign Office (1951-54); Minister of Supply (October 1954-April 1955); Minister of Defense (April-December 1955). His various posts have given him considerable conference experience, and he has traveled widely in connection with his duties. He is a familiar figure at the UNGA, and led the UK delegation to sessions of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO (Baghdad Pact). Lloyd accompanied Macmillan on his "reconnaissance" trip to Moscow in 1959.

Born in 1904, the son of a Liverpool doctor, Selwyn Lloyd attended Cambridge University, practiced law in the Liverpool area for some years, and achieved an excellent record as a staff officer in World War II. Among his military decorations he holds the U.S. Legion of Merit. A devout member of the Methodist Church, he divorced his wife in 1957, and gained custody of their young daughter.

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April 1960

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Biographic Information DivisionSTEVENS, Sir Roger BenthamUNITED KINGDOM

Sir Roger Stevens is one of the four Deputy Under Secretaries of State in the Foreign Office, and his supervisory duties are connected particularly with the Middle East departments (Levant, Eastern, Arabian). Before assuming his present position in 1958, he had served as British Ambassador to Iran since 1954, when diplomatic relations between the U.K. and Iran were resumed. Highly intelligent, with a shrewd, alert mind, and a good memory for details, Sir Roger is extremely conscientious, putting in long hours of overwork. He is a charming, cultured person and an excellent conversationalist, but his negotiating ability has been impaired at times in the past by a tendency to impatience and brusqueness. Several years ago he was believed not to be especially popular with his British colleagues, who, while recognizing his ability, were apt to regard him as overly aggressive and even arrogant. Sir Roger is cordial and friendly in his relations with Americans and is basically well disposed toward the United States. He is quick, however, to resent any slur against Great Britain.

Born in England in 1906, Roger Stevens was educated at Wellington College, and at Queen's College, Oxford. Entering the Consular Service in 1928, he served in Buenos Aires (1928-31); New York (1931-37); Antwerp (1937-38); and Valencia (1938-39). Following an assignment at the Foreign Office, he was promoted to Consul and posted to Denver, Colorado in 1942. From 1944 to 1946 he was attached to the British Embassy in Washington as Secretary of the British Civil Service Secretariat. In this post he was responsible for the coordination of the activities of the numerous British war missions then in the United States, and after the war he took charge of the liquidation of these groups. He returned to the Foreign Office in the spring of 1946, and two years later was appointed Assistant Under Secretary of State in charge of German economic affairs. In this latter post he played an active part in intergovernmental discussions on Germany, attending the Bizonal Fusion negotiations, the Six Power Conference on the Ruhr (Chairman of the U.K. delegation), and discussions on prohibited and restricted industries. He was named Ambassador to Sweden in 1951, and remained in Stockholm until his transfer to Tehran in 1954. In addition to his assignments in the United States, Stevens has visited this country several times on official business. He was present at the CENTO meetings held in Washington in October 1959. He was awarded the C.M.G. in 1947 and the K.C.M.G. in 1954.

Tall, thin, and stoop-shouldered, Sir Roger has a quick, rather nervous manner. He is hurried and awkward in his movements, and is somewhat untidy in appearance. Stevens married Constance Hallam Hipwell in 1931; they have one son. Sir Roger speaks French fluently, and has some knowledge of German.

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BAIG, Mirza Osman AliPAKISTAN

Mirza Osman Ali Baig, who assumed his duties as Secretary General of CENTO on January 7, 1959, served from 1953 to 1959 as Pakistan's High Commissioner to Canada. A quiet but competent and friendly man, with a keen mind, Baig was one of the most respected diplomats in Ottawa. He is considered an almost completely Westernized person, well disposed toward the United States and U.S. officials.

As Secretary General of CENTO Baig has often shown himself to be impatient, sharply critical, and frequently tactless. As a result, he is not on particularly good terms with the Turkish and Iranian members of the Council Deputies, although he dominates completely the Pakistani member. The British, on their part, have had to lean over backwards to get along with him. Baig is also largely responsible for rather low morale on the part of the Secretariat staff.

Born in Bombay in 1904, Baig was educated at Clifton College, Bristol, England, and the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, and was commissioned in the British Indian Army in 1924. He remained in the Army until 1930 when he resigned by request for engaging in seditious activities which included subversion of Indian officers and the distribution of seditious literature. Influential friends reportedly exerted pressure to prevent his being court-martialed, and shortly thereafter he entered the Political Department of the Government of India. His views on politics subsequently underwent an obvious change and he established a good record in the British consular service from 1930 to 1943, serving in various posts in Baroda, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province. In 1940 he was awarded the Order of the British Empire. From 1943 to 1946 he was Indian Consul to Portuguese India, and in 1944, he served as the consul general to French India. He served in the United States in 1946 as first secretary and agent general of the Government of India, and after partition of the subcontinent, as Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Pakistan Embassy in 1947, as Counselor from 1947 to 1950, and as Minister from 1950 to 1951. From 1951 to 1953 he served as Secretary of Pakistan's Foreign Ministry and was a delegate to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in 1952.

Baig's wife Juliette, is a Turk who spent much of her life in Egypt. Their son, Mirza M. Baig, is a sergeant in the U.S. Marines and is currently serving aboard the U.S.S. Independence. Baig speaks English, French, Urdu, Pashto, and Baluchi.

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QADIR, Manzur

PAKISTAN

Manzur Qadir, Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations since October 1958, led his country's delegation to the 14th Session of the UNGA for a short time before coming to Washington in late September 1959 for the SEATO and CENTO meetings. While he was in this country, Qadir was awarded a partial leave grant to visit the law schools of several leading American universities. Qadir is one of Pakistan's most able lawyers, particularly in the field of constitutional law. He has also had experience in international law. Qadir's relations with American official personnel, both in his private capacity as a lawyer and in his present ministerial post, have been cooperative and friendly.

Although Qadir reportedly appears to be a rather shy individual, he has a probing intellect, a strong sense of right and wrong, and a balanced judgment. His discourse is said to be inspiring and he expounds his theories with conviction. U.S. officials believe that Qadir can make a considerable contribution to the success of the regime if he and President Ayub Khan maintain the present cordial relationship.

Born in Lahore in 1913, Qadir was educated at Government College, Lahore, and Clare College, Cambridge, and was called to the bar from Lincoln's Inn (London) in 1935. He rose quickly to become Senior Advocate of the Federal Court of Pakistan and later of the Supreme Court. He is currently chairman of the Lahore Bar Council. In 1956 Qadir represented Pakistan at a session of the International Law Association in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia. He also represented his country at the International Law Association meeting in the United States in 1958. On the domestic side, Qadir has been associated with most of the leading constitutional cases in Pakistan since independence.

A member of a distinguished Lahore family, Qadir is married and has three children. He wears western dress and drinks alcoholic beverages. He is fluent in English and Urdu, and also speaks Punjabi.

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TEH D-14/1  
April 15, 1960

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION

Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

The United States and the CENTO International Budget

Position

Anticipated Position of Foreign Governments:

1. Pakistan is making a concerted effort to change the present equal-shares budget sharing formula and may be expected to advocate a modified capacity-to-pay formula with the United States and the United Kingdom paying one-third each and the regional states sharing equally the remaining third.
2. If Pakistan raises this issue, Iran and Turkey may be expected to support the Pakistani view.
3. The United Kingdom prefers the present equal-shares formula.

Recommended U. S. Position:

If the subject is raised in the Council, we may state:

1. The United States cannot agree to a modification of an equal shares formula. We have always considered CENTO as essentially a regional organization and believe this regional character can best be preserved through equal sharing of administrative and operating costs.
2. The United States appreciates the fact that the International Budget has increased and that shares became proportionately larger upon the withdrawal of Iraq. However, since the International Budget is not large, and since there is no apparent reason why it should be increased substantially above the present figure, the United States hopes that the regional members will agree that the Organization is sufficiently important to them to justify their continued financial support to it on the present basis.
3. Subject to Congressional appropriations, the United States is prepared to make a voluntary contribution to the CENTO International Budget for FY 1961 and later years based on the equal-shares formula, provided that (a) such budgets are approved by the United States and (b) the member states also agree to pay equal shares.

Discussion

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Discussion:

The United States believes that it would be psychologically disadvantageous and would detract from the regional character of CENTO to abandon the equal-sharing formula. It is possible also that any change in this formula could result in increased pressure toward a larger budget once regional members are making only a minimal contribution. We have therefore consistently refused to accede to previous suggestions for a change in the cost-sharing formula.

When the equal-shares budget formula was first accepted at the Tehran Ministerial Council session in April 1956, it was made clear that the United States would be prepared to make a one-sixth contribution to the budget then under discussion provided the member states would do likewise (Iraq was then a member of the Organization). At that time the Pakistani Prime Minister stated he would accept this sharing principle for 1956/57 only. The Iranians raised the issue in 1957, suggesting that either the NATO or the SEATO model be followed. (In the case of SEATO, Secretary of State Dulles agreed in 1957 at the third meeting of the Council that the members pay unequal shares of the budget beginning in 1959. The United States pays a 24.4 percent contribution to the NATO budget.)

Now the CENTO Secretariat has circulated under cover of CD/60/D24 the current Pakistani proposal for revision of the budget sharing formula. The proposal points out that there has been an increase of approximately 40 percent in the CENTO budget since 1957 with a concomitant rise in each member's contribution from 16 percent to 20 percent because of Iraq's withdrawal from the Organization. This is described as a disproportionate financial burden for the regional members, in view of their financial position. Pakistan therefore proposes the United States and United Kingdom each pay one-third and the regional states divide equally the last third (each regional state would thereby pay 11-1/9 percent of the total budget). The Pakistani proposal describes as realistic the sharing formula utilized in SEATO where we pay 25 percent, the United Kingdom 16 percent and Pakistan 8 percent. At the April 7 Council Deputies meeting, the Pakistani representative reiterated his Government's belief in the importance of this issue, giving his opinion that it might be raised at the Ministerial Council meeting [in spite of evident U.S.-U.K. opposition].

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Since CENTO's inception, there have been four approved international budgets. These have been as follows:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total in Dollars</u>	<u>U. S. Contribution</u>
1956/57	ID 160,425	\$449,190	\$ 76,457
1957/58	ID 225,497	\$631,392	\$105,588
1958/59	L 249,775	\$701,695	\$140,339
1959/60	L 262,878	\$736,058	\$147,212 (Estimated)

The draft budget for FY 1960/61 has not yet been prepared, but we have included \$175,000 in the requested "International Contingencies" appropriation for the Department of State, to enable the United States to make its voluntary contribution to CENTO's FY 1960/61 budget.

In addition to the International Budget there are three other CENTO budgets, namely: (a) the Counter-Subversion Office Operating Budget, for FY 1959/60 totaling L 39,740 (expenditures were considerably less owing to the disruption caused by Iraq's withdrawal); (b) the Combined Military Planning Staff Budget, for FY 1959/60 totaling L 61,576; and (c) the CENTO Institute of Nuclear Science Budget, for FY 1959/60 totaling L 23,920. The United States has paid a one-fifth share to the Counter-Subversion Office Operating Budget (in FY 1959/60 the U. S. share of the budget included unused funds carried over from past USIA and CIA support), and one-fifth to the Combined Military Planning Staff Budget (funded by the Department of Defense); it does not participate in the financing of the Institute of Nuclear Science.

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ADIB, Mohammad Hosein (Dr.)

IRAN

Dr. Mohammad Hosein Adib, appointed Minister of Health in March 1960, has been a prominent professor of Gynecology, obstetrics, and urology at the Medical School of the University of Tehran for the past twenty years.

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ALA, Hosein

IRAN

Minister of Court for the fifth time, Ala is a former Prime Minister and a former ambassador to the United States, having served under five Iranian rulers and two dynasties. Since the Shah's accession to the throne in 1941 Ala has been one of his closest and most trusted advisers. In his present position Ala frequently acts as the Shah's spokesman. Described as competent, conscientious, and loyal to the regime, Ala appears obsequious and colorless, lacking the force and spark to capture popular appeal. He has demonstrated, however, an unusual amount of personal and political courage. Strongly opposed to the Soviet Union, Ala has been consistently friendly and cooperative with American officials, and is favorably disposed toward the United States. Born November 11, 1883, he was educated in England at Harrow, Westminster, and the University of London where he studied law. He is married to Fatamah Qaraqozlu, daughter of a former Regent of Iran, Naser-ol-Molk. They have a daughter, educated at Bryn Mawr, and a son who attended Harvard. Hosein Ala speaks excellent English and French in addition to Persian.

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AMIR-KHATAMI, Mohammad (Maj. Gen.)

IRAN

Commander of the Imperial Iranian Air Force, Amir-Khatami is a competent pilot, qualified in jet aircraft. An athlete and sportsman, he is described as an effective and able officer, highly regarded in government circles, and respected by his associates. Khatami has considerable influence which is strengthened by the fact that he is the personal pilot of the Shah and is engaged to Princess Fatimeh, half-sister of the Shah. Khatami appears to be pro-Western and is particularly friendly to Americans. Born in Resht, 1918, he received a military education in Iran and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1941. After pilot training in England and West Germany, he attended Air Command and Staff College courses in the United States. Promoted to the rank of brigadier general in 1957, he was made a major general in September 1959. A Muslim of the Shia sect, he is a widower with one daughter, Sabrineh, born in 1955. Khatami speaks English and French fluently.

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AMUZEGAR, Jamshid (Dr.)

IRAN

Minister of Agriculture since late October 1959, Amuzegar previously served as Minister of Labor. Named to the latter post in September 1958, with the Shah's backing he reorganized the Ministry along functional lines, appointed able associates, and launched a program in the social welfare field aimed at winning labor support for the regime. Reportedly a leader among young Iranian officials who aspire to eliminate corruption from the government, Amuzegar has been careful to retain palace favor. However, he opposes the Shah's emphasis on military strength, asserting that stability in Iran depends upon an effective political and economic program. Although he appears markedly friendly toward the U.S., he has criticized the administration of the ICA program for being too widely diversified in Iran. American officials describe Amuzegar as having a logical mind and extensive organizing ability. He is said to be well informed on many subjects. Born 1923 in Tehran, he studied law at Tehran University. In 1943 he entered Cornell University where he received B.S. and M.S. degrees, later obtaining a Ph.D. in engineering from the University of Washington in 1949. On returning to Iran in 1951 he worked for a while in USOM before entering the Iranian Ministry of Public Health. Promoted to an Under Secretaryship in 1955, he remained there until he was appointed to the cabinet in 1958. He has served on delegations to numerous conferences. His wife is German; they have no children. Amuzegar speaks German and excellent English.

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ANSARI, Reza

IRAN

Reza Ansari, who entered the cabinet for the first time in January 1960 when he was appointed Minister of Labor, was formerly Under Secretary and Treasurer General in the Ministry of Finance. He is a member of the so-called "New Iran" group of young intellectuals, and within that group has been especially close to Jamshid Amuzegar, the present Minister of Agriculture. Dating from his years with Point IV, Ansari has been quite friendly with Americans. He is a polite and likeable man, efficient and honest, who is probably primarily an economist.

Ansari was born in 1923 at Meshed. He graduated in law from the University of Tehran, received an M.A. in 1950 from Utah State College, and did graduate work in economics at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1951. He speaks Farsi and excellent English. He is married.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Biographic Information Division

ANSARI, Vali (Maj. Gen.)

IRAN

Minister of Roads and Communications since 1955, an army engineering officer, and former Director of the Iranian State Railways, Ansari is a trusted confidant of the Shah. Considered one of the more able cabinet officers, he has a reputation for efficiency, intelligence, integrity, and political courage. Paradoxically, he is mild-mannered, diffident, and soft-spoken. Has been helpful and courteous in his dealings with American officials. Born about 1906, in Qasvin; received military education at St. Cyr, in France. After rising to command of engineer division in 1940, became Chief Inspector of State Railways, 1941-1943. Interned by British in latter year for alleged pro-Axis activities. Released in 1944, served as personal liaison officer between Shah and the General Staff until 1951. In 1949 accompanied Shah on visit to the U.S. Promoted to Brigadier General in July 1951, was appointed Military Attaché in Washington, representing Iran at Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in San Francisco, 1951. Returned to Iran late 1952 to become chief of Engineering and Signal Department of the Army. In January 1954, at personal order from Shah, became Director General of Iranian State Railways. Ansari entered the Ala Cabinet in April 1955 as Minister of Roads and Communications, retaining portfolio when Eqbal government was formed in April 1957. A bachelor, the General speaks French, English, and Persian.

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ARAM, Qolam Abbas

IRAN

Minister of Foreign Affairs since August 3, 1959, Aram previously served as Iranian Ambassador to Japan with concurrent accreditation to Nationalist China. Aram's first appearance at the UN was as head of the Iranian delegation to the 14th session of UNHRC. He is considered an able and enterprising career diplomat with an excellent over-all view of Iranian foreign policy, and through insight into the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During his diplomatic service in the United States he was receptive to new ideas and suggestions, winning the respect of American officials who dealt with him through his intelligent cooperation. Aram's amiability should not be regarded as weakness or lack of conviction; he is quite capable of taking a firm stand and of criticizing U.S. policy when he disagrees with it. He appears to have influential connections with the Court.

Born about 1903 in Tehran where he completed his secondary education, Aram later attended the University of Calcutta. He entered the Foreign Ministry in 1933. After service in India, Switzerland, and England, he was assigned to Washington from 1947 until 1951. He served in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1951-53, and was then appointed Counselor at Baghdad for a brief tour. In June 1953 he returned to Washington as Minister-Counselor. In April 1955 he was Director General, Office of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, and here he reportedly dealt directly with the Shah. Aram remained in the latter post until December 1957 when he was appointed Ambassador to Japan and Formosa. He is said to have considerable personal charm, a quiet but keen sense of humor, and pleasant manners. He speaks fluent English, French and Persian, and knows some Urdu.

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ARIANA, Hosein (Lt. Gen.)

IRAN

Ariana was designated Commander of the Imperial Iranian Army early in 1958 when the post was created. Prior to that time he had been Chief of Staff since October 1955. He served as military attaché to France from 1953 to 1955, during which period he attended the French War College as an observer, and completed work on his law degree. A firm supporter of the Shah and the current political regime, Ariana appears friendly to the United States and notably opposed to the USSR. He is somewhat anti-British, having been interned by them during the war. Reputed to be honest, reportedly his only income is his army salary. He is described as forceful and pompous, with a flair for the dramatic. Born March 1897, in Tehran, he attended the Iranian Military College after which he began the study of law. He has had a varied army career, holding a number of infantry command positions between 1927 and 1939. In 1942 he was assigned to the General Staff, and from 1943 until 1952 served in various staff and command posts. He was promoted to major general in 1955 and to lieutenant general in 1958. Married, he has a daughter and a son who graduated from the Iranian Military Academy in 1954. General Ariana speaks fluent French, and presumably some English.

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ATABAKI, Rehmatollah

IRAN

Ambassador Rehmatollah Atabaki, a member of the High Political Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was named to the important and difficult post of Minister of Interior on June 13, 1959. He is a rather colorless diplomat who seems to lack the qualifications for this position. It is speculated, however, that Atabaki was selected for this post because he will follow implicitly the Shah's instructions. It has been reported that he is on very good terms with former Prime Minister Fazlollah Zahedi whose niece he married.

Rahmetollah Atabaki was born at Tehran in 1903, a member of a distinguished family. He has a Bachelor of Law degree, from the University of Tehran. He entered the Foreign Ministry in 1930 and served in several different capacities in the Ministry before being assigned abroad. In October 1953 he was appointed Permanent Iranian Minister Plenipotentiary to the European Secretariat of the UN and concurrently Consul-General in Geneva. Atabaki was designated Iranian Minister to Lebanon in July 1954 and when the Legation was raised to an Embassy in July 1957 he became the Ambassador. Upon the completion of his assignment in Lebanon in early 1959, he returned to Tehran, and in April he was named to the High Political Council of the Foreign Ministry, then in June was appointed Minister of the Interior.

He speaks English, French and Farsi.

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BAKHTIAR, Timur (Lt. Gen.)

IRAN

Deputy Prime Minister and chief of the Iranian National Information and Security Organization (SAVAK), Lt. General Bakhtiar is one of the more important politico-military leaders of Iran. A frequent delegate to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) meetings, he is described as capable, realistic, anti-Russian, and anti-Communist. As chief of SAVAK, he controls, inter alia, the Iranian Government's covert and overt anti-Soviet propaganda. A favored member of the court and involved in many intrigues, his illicit love affairs are notorious. Bakhtiar was born 1914, at Isfahan, a member of the wealthy and powerful Bakhtiar clan. He was educated in local Isfahan schools and in Beirut and afterward enrolled at St. Cyr Military Academy in France, graduating in 1935. He rose rapidly to command and staff positions, and during the August 1953 disturbances his able defense of the throne earned him the rank of Brig. General. In December of that year he was named Military Governor of Tehran, in which post he was largely responsible for eradicating the Tudeh (Communist) Party organization. In September 1955 he was appointed Military Governor of Iranian State Railways in addition to his other duties. A cousin of former Queen Soraya Esfandaiari-Bakhtiar, his high position was apparently gained through her influence; his continuance in office indicates the Shah's confidence in his allegiance and ability. One of the most powerful men in Iran, he serves as agent of the Shah through his authority to censor the press and his demonstrated readiness to rule through strong-arm tactics. Though personally loyal to the Shah, the ambitious and opportunistic Bakhtiar is often mentioned as a possible coup leader if the present regime should weaken.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Biographic Information DivisionEQBAL, Mamchehr, (Dr.)IRAN

Prime Minister of Iran since April 1957, formerly served as Minister of Court and Chancellor of the University of Tehran. Has reputation for being forceful and energetic, although his repute as strong leader has waned somewhat due to his tenuous influence with the Shah. Conservatives and liberals alike regard Eqbal as hard-working, honest, independent, and intelligent. An able politician and rather demagogic speaker, he customarily appears haughty and gloomy; on occasion, however, can be charming and jovial, even emotional. Vain, sensitive, and easily flattered, regards himself as an exceptional man. Envisaging his public role as one who could, through authoritarian means, lead Iran into modern ways; Eqbal reportedly possesses the ability to accomplish this if granted the power.

Born 1908 in Meshed; received his medical education in France; began his medical career in Iran, 1935; joined the faculty of the University of Tehran, 1938. From 1943 to 1950 served in several cabinets, frequently as Minister of Health but also, at various times, as Minister of Education, Roads, Interior, and Communications. From June 1950 to September 1951, when Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq forced him to resign, Eqbal distinguished himself as an unusually capable governor of Azerbaijan. In March 1954 he was elected to the Senate; in January 1955 he became Chancellor of Tehran University; in June 1956 he was named Minister of Court. Dr. Eqbal's visit to the United States in early 1956, under the exchange of persons program, reinforced his friendship and respect for America.

Dr. Eqbal gives the impression of being an agnostic materialist, indifferent to religious and philosophical concepts. He speaks fluent French and some English. Married, he has three daughters.

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ESHRAQI, Amir Qasim

IRAN

Minister of Posts, Telephones, and Telegraphs since October 1950, Eshraqi has served in three successive cabinets, under three prime ministers. Before assuming his present office he functioned as an Under Secretary in the PTT Ministry. An engineer and former Deputy Managing Director of the Plan Organization, Eshraqi has made official visits to Sweden, West Germany, England, and France. In 1956 he was awarded the medal of the Legion of Honor. He attended the Baghdad Pact Communications Conference in Ankara, September 1957. In June 1958, as a guest of the Soviet Government, he toured the USSR where he inspected communications installations. Eshraqi is married to a Frenchwoman, and they have a daughter studying in Switzerland.

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HEDAYAT, Abdollah (Gen.)

IRAN

Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff since the creation of that office in 1955, General Hedayat previously served as Minister of War and before that was Commandant of the War College. Purposeful, serious, and reserved, he has been described as intelligent, politically ambitious, and tending to advance his aims by intrigue. In 1942 he opposed establishment of the U.S. Military Mission to the Iranian Army, charging that it would interfere with Iranian internal affairs. A visit to the United States in 1947 as head of a military purchasing commission apparently dispelled his fears, and in recent years he has been friendly and cooperative. Hedayat is staunchly loyal to the Shah, implacably anti-Soviet, and generally pro-West.

Born about 1902, a member of an influential family, he was educated at French military schools. Commissioned a second lieutenant in 1920, he rose through the ranks to become a major general in 1946, lieutenant general in 1954, and full general in 1958, the first Iranian officer to attain that grade. He was appointed Commandant of the Military College in December 1942. Named Deputy Minister of War in 1946, and Commandant of the War College in February 1950, he functioned briefly in both positions concurrently. Designated Minister of War in June 1950, he was relieved of the post in 1951 during a government change. He returned to head the War College, where he remained until his voluntary retirement in 1953. Later that year, during formation of a new cabinet, he was recalled as Minister of War. Hedayat served in the cabinet until his appointment to the Supreme Commander's Staff in 1955. He suffered a heart ailment in January 1959, and after his recovery made an orientation visit to the United States, during which he underwent a medical examination at Walter Reed Army Hospital. General Hedayat is married and has two sons. He speaks Persian, English, and French fluently. His wife speaks excellent English.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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HEDAYAT, Khosrow

IRAN

Khosrow Hedayat, Deputy Prime Minister and Director of the Plan Organization is a construction engineer, a labor leader and a politician. Born in 1904 in Tehran, he was educated at the School of Law, Tehran, and after study at the University of Ghent became a construction engineer. Hedayat began his engineering career in Czechoslovakia in 1931 and followed this with a year with the French railways administration in 1932. Returning to Iran, most of his engineering work has been in relation to railways. In 1944 he was one of the founders of the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers in Iran (ESKI). In 1947 he was elected to the 15th Majlis. Except for a brief return to Iran in 1953 Hedayat spent from 1950 to March 1955 in Europe. A month after his return he was appointed Parliamentary Undersecretary in the Ministry of Roads. He was appointed Deputy Director of the Plan Organization in March 1956, and Director in March 1959. Hedayat is a secondary level leader who, through his political dexterity, opportunism and ability, will probably continue to hold positions at or near the cabinet level. He has an unsavory reputation for graft and scandal but is however, a good administrator with a knack for getting things done and with the ability to handle people. He is also a good and persuasive orator.

The Hedayat family is large and influential. Khosrow's brother Abdullah is Chief of the Supreme General Staff. Khosrow Hedayat was married to a Belgian by whom he had two daughters. They were divorced in September 1955 and he later married Aqtara Masud. Hedayat speaks fluent French and poor English.

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HEDAYATI, Mohammed Ali (Dr.)

IRAN

Minister of Justice since March 1958, Dr. Hedayati has an impressive legal background and a profound knowledge of the Iranian juridical system. Under his administration the Justice Department gives promise of elevating judiciary standards and prestige, and he has made several significant contributions toward this objective. Considered an able technician, respected and popular with his colleagues, Hedayati is not a politician. Although a founding member and staunch supporter of Prime Minister Eqbal's majority party, Hedayati lacks the power and force to institute needed reforms in a corrupt bureaucracy. Born February 1911 in Tehran, he was educated in Iran. He graduated from the University of Paris in 1931, obtained a law degree from the University of Tehran in 1935, and won a LL.D. in criminal law from the University of Geneva in 1939. He began his career as a magistrate in the Ministry of Justice, 1935-1936, was named Judge of Appeals Court in 1940, and was a member of the faculty, University of Tehran Law School, 1941-1958. He was elected Majlis deputy in 1950, 1955 and 1956, and was a UN delegate in 1955 and 1957. He has published several books in the field of law. Hedayati's father is a retired member of the Supreme Court, and the family has been prominent in Iran for over 300 years. Married, he has two sons and one daughter.

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KASEMI, Nosrathollah

IRAN

A former Secretary General of Prime Minister Eqbal's Melliyun (Nationalistic) Party, Kasemi was designated Minister of State in September 1958. Kasemi's appointment to the cabinet was widely interpreted as evidence that Eqbal was succeeding in placing his supporters in important positions.

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MANSUR, Hasan Ali

IRAN

Hasan Ali Mansur, Minister of Commerce and former Minister of Labor is described as an able and ambitious official with high executive ability. The son of a former prime minister and member of a wealthy, influential family, Mansur was born in 1923 in Tehran. Graduating in 1945 from the University of Tehran, he entered the diplomatic service, studying law while stationed in Paris. Transferred to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 1950, he attended the 9th and 10th UN General Assemblies (1954 and 1955), and in 1956 was named chief of the political division of the Foreign Ministry, where he demonstrated a friendly cooperation with the U.S. Embassy. Mansur is suave and ingratiating in manner, a pleasant and considerate host. His wife, whom he married in 1956, is socially prominent in Iran. He speaks excellent French, good English, and some German.

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Biographic Information Division

Mehrān, Mahmaud (Dr.)

IRAN

Minister of Education since 1955, Mehran reportedly was initially appointed to the cabinet because of his reputation as an implacable foe of Communism. Described as a colorless civil servant, he has remained in office on the basis of his competence and broad experience in educational affairs. He favors European as opposed to U.S. educational methods. Mehran was born 1902 in Tehran and graduated from the University of Tehran, later obtaining the LL.D. degree from the University of Paris in 1922. He held responsible positions in the Ministry of Education from 1922 to 1946, when he was named chief adviser to the Ministry of Labor, attending the ILO conference in Geneva in May 1946. Mehran served in the Ministry of Education from October 1947 to August 1954, most of the time as Under Secretary. He assumed his present position in April 1955, under Prime Minister Hosein Ala, retaining the portfolio in the Eqbal cabinet, formed in April 1957. Dr. Mehran has pleasant, courteous manners, and speaks fluent French but little English. His Italian wife speaks French, Persian and Italian, but knows no English. They have two daughters and a son.

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PAHLAVI, Mohammad Reza Shah

IRAN

His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shah-in-Shah, is the ruling monarch and dominant political figure in Iran. A complex individual, he is intelligent, personable, well-educated and at the same time sensitive, indecisive, and inclined to be suspicious. Motivated by patriotism and a desire to establish his place in Iranian history, he has asserted strong if not always wise leadership. Opposed to Communism, he has sought to improve his government's relations with the Soviet Union even while recognizing the threat to Iran and the throne posed by Soviet economic penetration. Convinced of Iran's strategic importance, and of the fact that Iranian oil is indispensable to the West, the Shah hopes to gain a favorable position for Iran in the Middle East, within the Western bloc, and vis-a-vis the USSR. A true if sometimes vacillating friend of the United States, his firm alignment with the West has required frequent reassurances and encouragement from American officials. Since April 1955 he has assumed an increasingly active role in the government and now appears to dominate the cabinet. He visited the United States in 1949, in the winter of 1954-55, and in June 1958. In July 1956 he visited the Soviet Union. Interested in military affairs, the Shah wants to increase and strengthen the Iranian Armed Forces, but his requests for military aid have impressed qualified American officials as excessive. He considers himself an expert strategist and tactician, and would take offense at blunt contradictions of his theories in military matters.

Born October 26, 1919, the Shah was educated in Switzerland and Iran's Imperial Military Academy (Tehran). He ascended the throne on September 16, 1941 upon the abdication of his father, the late Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah's first wife was Princess Fawzia, sister of ex-King Farouk of Egypt, whom he divorced in 1948 and by whom he had one daughter, Princess Shahness. In February 1951 he married Soraya Esfandiari-Bakhtiari, whom he divorced in March 1958; they had no children. In December 1959 he married Farah Diba, a 21-year old commoner. The Shah speaks fluent French and English.

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SHAHIN, Habibullah (Vice Admiral)

IRAN

Vice Admiral Habibullah Shahin, has been Commander of the Imperial Iranian Navy since October 1953. Little is known of his professional abilities, but he is not considered to be a strong or impressive leader. In his contacts with Americans he has always been cooperative and anxious to please. Admiral Shahin visited the Soviet Union in 1957 and the United States in early 1958.

Habibullah Shahin was born in Isfahan in 1907 and graduated from the Military School in 1925. Four years after his graduation he was sent to Italy to study naval affairs at the Italian Naval Academy, and several years after that he returned to Italy to attend a Naval Command Course. His career includes more shore, staff type assignments than seagoing commands. In 1950 he was named Commander of Naval Forces on the Persian Gulf, and in October 1953 he assumed the highest office in the Navy, Chief of Staff. His title has since been changed to Commander of the Navy as a result of a reorganization of the Iranian armed forces command structure.

Vice Admiral Shahin, who is rather heavy set, does not smoke and probably does not drink. He is married and has two children. In addition to his native Persian he speaks good Italian, French and English.

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April 1960

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SHARIF-EMAMI, Jafar

IRAN

Iranian Minister of Mines and Industries; and a former Senator, Sharif-Emami served previously as Minister of Roads and briefly as Director of the Plan Organization. He has keen intelligence, competence, and technical ability, particularly in matters relating to railroads. Many Iranians consider him pro-British if not a British agent. Born 1909, in Tehran, he attended a university in Germany, with post-graduate work in railway engineering at the University of Stockholm. He held various positions in Railroad Department of Ministry of Roads, and in the Ministry of Agriculture. During World War II he was interned by the Allies for pro-German activities. In 1950, after five years of private contracting, he was named Minister of Roads and Director of Railways in the Razmara Cabinet. In 1952 he became a member of the Supervisory Council of the Plan Organization, serving as Director from August to October 1953. Elected to the Senate in 1954, he retired three years later to assume his present position in the Eqbal government. Sharif-Emami speaks French, German, Swedish, English, and some Russian.

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VOSUQ, Ahmad (Maj. Gen.)

IRAN

Minister of War since August 1955, Vosuq previously served as Chief of the Iranian Military Mission to the United States. He appears friendly to both American and British officials, who describe him as intelligent, conscientious, and influential in military circles. He has been termed, however, an opportunist whose allegiance would be dictated by personal advantage. Despite his tendency toward opportunism, Vosuq demonstrated a basic loyalty to the Shah in 1952 when he resigned as Deputy Minister of War rather than join the governing clique which opposed the regime. Born in 1898 in Tehran, where he received his primary schooling, he later studied in France and graduated from St. Cyr Military Academy in 1924. In 1941 he attended the Iranian Staff College, and the following year took a course of training at a technical engineering school in Germany. Vosuq's varied military career has included training and command assignments, culminating in the post of Chief of the Imperial Gendarmerie. He was promoted to major general in 1951, and to lieutenant general in 1958. Married to a daughter of a retired general, he has three daughters. Vosuq speaks both French and English in addition to Persian.

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ZARQAM, Ali Akbar (Brig. Gen.)

IRAN

Brig. Gen. Ali Akbar Zarqam, the Minister of Finance, is a professional soldier and reportedly a protege of the Shah. Before his first cabinet appointment in 1957 he had had several years experience in both the monopoly and customs administrations. He was reportedly a supporter of Gen. Hasan Arfa (now Iranian Ambassador to Turkey) in 1953 and 1954 when Arfa was attempting to unseat Prime Minister Zahedi. A strict disciplinarian, Zarqam is an energetic, strong-willed, stubborn man who will not listen to advice.

Ali Akbar Zarqam was born in 1906 in Tehran, and was educated at the Iranian Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1938. He served in several command and staff positions until July 1953 when, as a colonel, he was appointed Director General of the Sugar Monopoly and Chief of Section 5 of the Army Inspection Department. In August 1954 he was assigned to the Ministry of War, and in September of the next year he was promoted to brigadier general. General Zarqam became Director-General of Customs in the Ministry of Finance in January 1956 and the following month was assigned to serve concurrently as Second Deputy Chief of the Military College. In July he became First Deputy Chief. Zarqam entered the cabinet in April 1957 as Minister of Monopolies and Customs. Earlier in that year he came to the United States on a Point IV Public Administration Grant. He was appointed Minister of Finance in December 1959.

General Zarqam was married in 1940 and had four daughters. He speaks English.

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AYGUN, Kemal

TURKEY

Kemal Aygun, Mayor of Istanbul and former Director General of Public Security, is a career civil servant with about 20 years' administrative and police experience. He is ambitious, capable, and intelligent and completely amenable to direction and loyal to his superiors regardless of their political affiliations. He is also regarded as an extremely strict administrator. Aygun has visited the United States and is friendly toward this country.

Kemal Aygun was born on July 24, 1914 in the town of Divrigi and graduated in 1936 from the Faculty of Political Science of Istanbul University. After his graduation and military service Aygun served as a tax collector with the Ministry of Finance in Istanbul and in March 1938 he became an assistant district governor, first in Istanbul and later in Bozkipir.

Aygun first entered the Public Security Organization in 1940, and for the next 12 years he served with the Istanbul police in various capacities, including Acting Chief of Police. In 1952 he was appointed Governor of Ankara and Director of the General Directorate of Public Security. Aygun left the Directorate of Public Security in May 1954 and became the Assistant to the Mayor of Ankara, at the same time continuing as Governor of Ankara Province. He was Director of Public Security from September 1955 to July 1958 when he was elected mayor of Istanbul.

For four months in 1949 Aygun studied traffic problems in Italy and for eight months in 1951 and 1952 he studied police administration and organization in the United States. Aygun also visited Finland in the spring of 1951 and attended the Edinburgh Festival in 1958.

Aygun is married and has one child. He is related to Refik Koraltan, President of the Grand National Assembly (GNA). In addition to his native Turkish, Aygun speaks a little French.

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BAYAR, Celal

TURKEY

Celal Bayar, President of Turkey, a former Prime Minister, and a founder and first President of the Democrat Party (DP), is primarily a specialist in economic and financial affairs. More observant of his constitutional limitations than his predecessors, Bayar has approved the broad policies of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and has left their implementation to Menderes. Internationally, Bayar favors close alignment with the West and desires increased economic assistance from the United States.

Celal Bayar was born on May 15, 1884, at a village near Bursa. He attended a French secondary school in Bursa until 1904 when he entered the Wiener Bank Verein (Bank of Vienna) in Istanbul and, in 1915, became an official of the Hibari Milli (National Credit) Bank in Izmir. Bayar began his political career in 1920 as a deputy to the last Ottoman Parliament, and has since held many cabinet posts.

When Bayar's Democrat Party came into power after the elections of 1950, Bayar was the natural choice for the office of President. Believing that the President should be the head of the nation and not just of one party, Bayar resigned from the presidency of the DP. In his capacity as Chief of State he has made a number of state visits to friendly countries. In January 1954 he came to the United States and thus became the first Turkish Chief of State to visit this country.

Celal Bayar is married to the quiet but energetic Madame Reside Bayar. One son, Turgut, is a successful businessman, and their daughter, Nilufer, is married to an Ankara Physician. For his recreation President Bayar enjoys horseback riding, yachting, and bridge. In addition to his native Turkish, he speaks French.

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BERK, Medeni

TURKEY

Medeni Berk, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State, and formerly Minister of Reconstruction, is an economist who was the only successful Democrat Party candidate from Nigde in the 1957 elections. Berk was born at Nigde in 1913 and graduated from the University of Istanbul. After graduation he served in the Agriculture Bank of Izmir and the Real Estate and Credit Bank until 1957 when he began his political career. He is married and has one daughter. His languages are French and Turkish.

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ERDELHUN, Mustafa Rustu (Gen.)

TURKEY

General Erdelhun, Chief of the General Staff, is considered the most capable senior officer in the Turkish Army and one well qualified for his position. Sincere and likeable, he is also industrious, and appears to have won the respect of large segments of the army. Although pro-American and most cooperative with American military advisers, he will not accept advice or suggestions that are not compatible with Turkish capabilities and policies. Erdelhun is a close friend of former President Ismet Inonu, head of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), and is probably more sympathetic with the RPP than with the Democrat Party (DP) of Prime Minister Menderes. It is said that certain influential DP members opposed Erdelhun's appointment as Chief of Staff, but the General is discreet, avoids any semblance of political entanglement, and has won official and popular acclaim in his present position.

Rustu Erdelhun was born in 1895 at Edirne (ancient Adrianople) in European Turkey. Educated at the Turkish Military Academy, he graduated in 1914, served with various artillery regiments during World War I, and was promoted to captain in 1921. In 1926 he graduated from the Military Staff College and served as an instructor there until 1931. From 1932 to 1937 he was Turkish military attaché at Tokyo. While in Japan he served one year with a Japanese artillery regiment and learned to speak fluent Japanese. From 1939 to 1943 he was military attaché at London. In September 1946 he was appointed Director of Training, and in February 1952 became Chief Turkish Liaison Officer to the United Nations Command at Tokyo. Erdelhun was promoted to lieutenant general in August 1952, and became Commander of the 18th Army Corp. In February 1954 he accompanied President Bayar on his visit to the United States. He was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Geneva Conference in April 1954, a member of the delegation to the London Conference in February 1955. He became a full general in August 1956. Early in 1958 he accompanied Prime Minister Menderes on a trip to the Far East and in August was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

General Erdelhun is a cultured, well-read man and an accomplished linguist, fluent in English, French, and Japanese. He has received many Turkish and foreign decorations. About 5 feet 8 inches tall, he weighs 180 pounds, has thin graying hair, blue eyes, and a fair complexion. His military prowess, energy, good looks and good manners make him a general who would be a credit to any nation. Erdelhun is married but has no children.

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KORALTAN, Refik

TURKEY

Refik Koraltan, who has been President of the Grand National Assembly since 1950, is the second-ranking executive of the country, coming after the President. As one of the four original founders of the Democrat Party (DP), Koraltan may be expected to be influential as long as the DP stays in power. He is a skillful politician and frequently heads parliamentary delegations to foreign countries on goodwill missions. Koraltan was born in 1889 at Divriki, Sivas Province, and graduated in law from the University of Istanbul. He is an energetic, smooth, unintellectual extrovert and quite well-to-do. It is reported that he knows only the Turkish language. He is married and has four children. His son, Urhan, received a doctorate in engineering from the University of Michigan in 1944 and is now deputy general manager of the Maritime bank of Istanbul.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Biographic Information DivisionKURAL, AdnanTURKEY

Adnan Kural, the newly appointed Ambassador to Athens and the former Ambassador to Syria, is a highly intelligent and respected senior diplomat whose extensive experience abroad and at the UN has given him an intimate knowledge of a wide range of international problems. While he is culturally biased toward France and things French, he appears to be fully in accord with basic United States political objectives. In the Foreign Office he is regarded as a Middle East expert and may well have played a major part in shaping current Turkish policy toward Iraq. He has a good understanding of intelligence operations, and is said to have great respect for Israeli intelligence. Kural is a quiet, reserved man with a pleasant but deliberate manner. Aside from Turkish he speaks excellent French, good English, some Italian, and possibly some Russian. In the Turkish diplomatic corps he has been closely associated with Foreign Minister Rustu Zorlu and Ambassador Selim Sarper. It is said that Kural was sent to Athens because the need was felt for a very capable ambassador at that post.

Adnan Kural was born at Paris in 1910. He received his lycée education in France and began to study engineering, but returned to Turkey before the completion of his course and graduated in law from the University of Ankara. Kural joined the Foreign Ministry in 1934 and for the next ten years held various posts in Ankara and abroad. In 1944 he was assigned as First Secretary in Moscow and while there he earned the confidence and respect of the then Turkish Ambassador to the USSR, Selim E. Sarper. When Sarper was named Ambassador to Italy in 1946 he requested that Kural be assigned as his Counselor of Embassy. In the following year, when Sarper was named Turkish Permanent Representative to the United Nations, he requested that Kural be assigned to the Permanent Delegation to the UN as his Counselor. Kural remained in this capacity until August 1951 when, with an extensive background in UN affairs, he returned to Ankara to become Deputy Director General of the Third Department (UN Affairs) of the Foreign Ministry and in the following year became Director General of this department. From that time until his appointment as Minister to Syria in March 1955 Kural had the primary responsibility for policy decisions on all matters involving the UN, and as a result of this competence became one of the half dozen key men in the Foreign Ministry. He served as Turkish Minister to Syria until early 1958 and then became Chief Legal Counselor in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Adnan Kural, who is separated from his wife, has two sons. In his student days Kural was a wrestler, a fencer, and a weight lifter, and he is still quite agile for his stocky build. Among his many and varied leisure time interests are hunting, photography, and bridge, which he enjoys playing all night. He collects firearms of all sorts, and also automobile license plates.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Biographic Information DivisionMENDERES, AdnanTURKEY

Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey since May 22, 1950, is a strong, capable leader, an effective speaker, and a good negotiator. He is a dynamic man who has proved himself to be an astute politician as well as an able diplomat. His political following is drawn largely from the peasantry and the laboring classes and he is probably less popular with the intellectual classes who resent his authoritarian ways. During his term of office Turkey's standard of living and military effectiveness has improved greatly. Menderes is extremely sensitive to criticism and has a desire to remain in power.

Born at Aydin, Turkey in 1899, Menderes was orphaned at an early age and was brought up by his grandmother who ably managed the considerable land holdings left him by his parents. In 1916 he left the (American) International College in Izmir to join the Ottoman Army and in 1921 fought in the Turkish War of Independence. His military duties completed, Menderes returned to Aydin and became a leading citizen. In 1932 he became a significant figure in the short-lived "Free Party"; a party created by Ataturk to form a loyal opposition to the Republican People's Party. Following the dissolution of the "Free Party" Menderes joined the Republican People's Party and in 1936 was elected a Deputy for Aydin. While a deputy he graduated in law at Ankara University.

After Ataturk's death in 1937 Menderes became increasingly dissatisfied with the economic and foreign policies of his party but withheld most of his criticism until after World War II. In 1945 he openly attacked the then Prime Minister, Saracoglu, and in September was expelled from the party. The following January Menderes, Fuat Koprulu, Celal Bayar (President since 1950) and others founded the Democrat Party. In May 1950, when the Democrat Party won the national elections, Menderes was a natural choice for Prime Minister.

Adnan Menderes speaks English, French and Turkish. He is married to the niece of the wife of former Foreign Minister Tevfik Rustu Aras and has two sons. He is related to Fatih Bustu Zorlu through his wife since Zorlu is married to Aras' daughter. Although Adnan Menderes and the present Minister of National Defense Eten Menderes share the same surname, they are not related.

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MENDERES, Etem

TURKEY

Etem Menderes, appointed Minister of National Defense on January 19, 1958, served previously in this capacity from August 1952 to September 1955. During the period since his first appointment to the cabinet, he has held variously the portfolios of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Public Works in addition to Defense. Etem Menderes has earned the reputation of being a kind yet firm administrator, able to cope with difficult situations, and has not been subject to the criticisms leveled against some of his colleagues. He is friendly in his dealings with Americans and is considered to be generally receptive to American military ideas. On international questions he frequently reflects the thinking of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. The two men have been life-long friends, but are not related by blood, both having adopted the same surname in the 1920's. Etem Menderes enjoys the full confidence of the Prime Minister.

Menderes was born in 1899 in Aydin, fought in World War I and in the Turkish War of Independence, and was educated at the (American) International College in Izmir. He was active in local politics until 1950, when he was elected to the Grand National Assembly. In August 1952 he entered the cabinet as Minister of Interior and has since held several portfolios. In May 1954 he visited the United States with the Prime Minister. Etem Menderes, who speaks some English, is poised and straightforward and has a pleasant personality.

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POLATKAN, Hasan

TURKEY

Hasan Polatkan, Minister of Finance since December 1956, previously served in the same capacity from December 1950 to December 1955. He was also acting Minister of Industry in 1959. A staunch supporter and friend of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Polatkan has achieved a reputation for intelligence, ability, friendliness, and cooperation, and is a competent though not outstanding Minister of Finance who is considered quite sound and conservative by American economic observers.

Polatkan, who was born at Eskisehir in 1915, received his higher education at the Faculty of Finance at Ankara University. He served in the Ministry of Finance and later in the Agriculture Bank, until his election to the GNA in 1946. In May 1950 he was named Minister of Labor in the first Democrat Party (DP) cabinet and afterward served briefly as Minister of Public Works before his initial appointment as Minister of Finance. In December 1955, Polatkan, Zorlu, and another minister were forced to resign under charges of abuse of power in certain import matters. The ministers were absolved of these charges by the GNA in June 1956, and in the following December Polatkan returned to the Finance Ministry.

Polatkan, who speaks little French and no English, generally observes Muslim precepts and restrictions but does not object to an occasional social cigarette or drink. He is married and has one child.

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SARPER, Selim E.

TURKEY

Selim E. Sarper, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, is an experienced career diplomat, influential, well informed, and ambitious. He is a good, though somewhat dictatorial, executive and an astute politician. As a representative at the UN, where he served on a number of committees and as the Turkish representative on the Security Council in 1952, he performed his duties quietly and efficiently, consistently favored a stronger UN, and was always friendly and cooperative with the United States delegation. He is noted for his anti-Communism, and for many years has strongly advocated orienting Turkish foreign policy toward the United Kingdom and the United States.

Sarper was born on June 14, 1899, in Istanbul, the son of an Ottoman Empire provincial governor. He studied at Robert College, in Istanbul, and in Germany, where he took a law degree. After four years of teaching French at the Adana Lycee, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1927, thereafter serving in increasingly responsible diplomatic positions in the Soviet Union, the Balkans, and the Ministry in Ankara. Assigned to the Press Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office in 1939, he served as its Secretary General and as Director General of Press.

In 1941, at the invitation of the German High Command, Sarper made a tour of the Crimean front, where he was greeted by Adolf Hitler. In July 1944, when he presented his credentials as Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, he was pointedly reminded of this visit. Sarper was recalled in 1945 after notifying his government that no results could be expected from his assignment. In May 1945 Sarper visited the United States as a member of a Railway Purchasing Commission. He was named Ambassador to Italy in September 1946, remaining at that post until appointed Permanent Representative to the UN in 1947. In March 1957 he became Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and in March 1960 was appointed Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ambassador Sarper is married and has two children. He speaks fluent English, French and German in addition to his native Turkish.

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YETKINER, Ethem

TURKEY

Ethem Yetkiner, governor of the Vilayet of Istanbul since July 1958, is a career government administrator who was banished, possibly as a scapegoat, to virtual political exile when he was appointed as governor of Hatay following the September 1955 riots in Izmir, Istanbul and Ankara; the implication was that he was one of the government officials who had not exercised sound judgment in the discharge of his official functions. His appointment as acting governor of Istanbul province and mayor of the city of Istanbul in 1957 and his permanent appointment to the same position in July 1958 suggested that he was once again politically acceptable; however, it has been reported that Prime Minister Menderes is still not pleased with Istanbul Vali Ethem Yetkiner. Yetkiner is often bureaucratic and indifferent in his dealings with foreigners.

Born in Rodos in 1912 Yetkiner graduated from law school in 1935. Entering the government the same year, he had held the following positions before being appointed to Istanbul: Kaymakam of Bucak, Kusadasi, and Oltu, Inspector of the Civil Administration, Deputy Vali and later Mayor of Kutahya, Governor of Cankiri, Governor of Kocaeli, and Assistant Minister of Interior.

Governor Yetkiner is paunchy and unimpressive in appearance. He is unmarried but has a charming sister who acts as his official hostess. Neither the Governor nor his sister speaks English.

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ZORLU, Fatin RustuTURKEY

Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the Turkish delegation to the UNIA, is an intelligent, capable, and aggressive diplomat who has demonstrated outstanding ability in dealing with foreign affairs and economic problems. He and Prime Minister Menderes, with the backing and prestige of President Celal Bayar, constitute a strong team which directs both the internal and external affairs of the Turkish Government. Zorlu is extremely difficult to work with and at times is apt to rely more on whim and intuition than on solid staff work. He is impatient and domineering, and likes to be treated as a person of great importance. Known as a "tough" negotiator, he usually asks far too much and is unwilling to back down or compromise once he has taken a position. The new Foreign Minister is deeply committed to the West and strongly opposes Soviet policies; however, he has given evidence of believing that a certain amount of trade with the Soviet bloc would be an asset to the Turkish economy, and possibly a lever for obtaining more aid from the United States. Zorlu has no political following in Turkey and seems to owe his position almost entirely to his close relationship with Prime Minister Menderes.

Zorlu was born at Istanbul on April 20, 1910, the son of a high-ranking official of the Ottoman Empire and the grandson of a Russian who emigrated from Poland to Turkey. Educated at Ecole Libre des Sciences Internationales in Paris, and at the University of Geneva in Switzerland, he entered the Turkish diplomatic service in 1932 and served at the League of Nations, and in Paris, Moscow, and Beirut. From 1949 to 1952 he had primary responsibility for the conduct of Turkish economic relations with foreign countries.

In April 1952 Zorlu was appointed Permanent Representative of Turkey to the NATO Council, with the rank of Ambassador. He retained this position after his election to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in May 1954 and his subsequent appointment as Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister. In July 1955 he left the Deputy Prime Ministership to become Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. In December 1955 Zorlu and the two other ministers were forced to leave the cabinet as a result of charges of abuse of power on certain important matters. The three ministers were absolved of blame by the GNA in June 1956, and in the following month Zorlu reentered the cabinet as Minister of State. He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs on November 25, 1957.

Zorlu, who is tall and distinguished in appearance, speaks good English and is fluent in French and German. He is married to Esra Aras.

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AVEROFF-TOSSITSAS, Evangelos

GREECE

Evangelos Averoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Karamanlis cabinet formed on May 17, 1958, served in the same capacity in the last Karamanlis cabinet from May 28, 1956 to March 2, 1958. Originally a Liberal Party member, Averoff cooperated with Karamanlis in the elections of 1956 and has since that date thrown in his lot with the National Radical Union (ERE) Party. He is a wealthy, urbane man, and a capable minister. Although generally considered cooperative with the U.S. Embassy and reasonable in discussion, he is not at all subservient to or dependent on Americans. He welcomes suggestions, but makes his own decisions.

Born April 17, 1910, in Trikkala, Thessaly, of a family with considerable lumber and textile interests in northern Greece, Averoff studied law at the University of Athens, and obtained the degree of doctor of political and economic sciences from the University of Lausanne in 1934. He has published a number of articles on political and economic subjects, and speaks English, French and Greek. He is married and has a daughter born in 1948.

Averoff returned to Greece in 1934 and lived for some years in Epirus, occupied with family enterprises. During the Greco-Italian War he volunteered for a secret military mission in Epirus, was arrested by the Italians in April 1943, and was sent to a concentration camp in Italy. Within a month he escaped from the camp and went to Rome, where he helped organize an underground railroad to assist Greeks in escaping from Italy. He was decorated by the British Government for his services to British intelligence during the war. After the war Averoff was elected a Liberal Party deputy to the Vouli (Parliament) from the Ioannia constituency and held several cabinet posts under Sophocles Venizelos (1949-52). In March 1951 he visited the United States. After 1952 he was relatively inactive in politics occupying himself with family business, until his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 1956. Since 1957 he has been head of the Greek delegations to the UN General Assembly.

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CAROLOU, Mary

GREECE

Lady Mary Carolou, an American citizen, and Grand Mistress of the Court of Greece, is the wife of Christopher N. Carolou, a wealthy Greek industrialist. An attractive woman and an easy conversationalist, she is interested in philosophy, literature, and the arts, as well as in people. She is also dignified and conscious of the delicacy of her role as an American in a foreign court.

One of several children, Mary Carolou was born April 16, 1906 at Philadelphia, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Constantine X. Stephanou. Her father and mother, both born in Epirus, emigrated to the United States in 1895 and became naturalized citizens. Constantine Stephanou began his career as a cigarette vendor on the streets of Philadelphia and eventually built a fortune in the cigarette business. He died in 1944. His daughter, Mary, attended private schools in Pennsylvania and went to Europe for travel and study abroad. While in London she married Christopher N. Carolou on October 27, 1927. Christopher Carolou is a graduate of the London School of Economics and also studied in the United States. He is a Greek citizen, president of the Hellenic Technical Supply Corporation, and a man of considerable means and high social standing. The Carolou's have no children.

Mary Carolou became Lady in Waiting to Queen Frederika in June 1947. It was decided by the Embassy, in consultation with the Department of State, that although she had acquired Greek citizenship by her marriage and although she had accepted a position within the government of Greece, she could retain her American passport since her position as Lady in Waiting was honorary, did not require an oath of allegiance, and could be considered to be in the interest of the United States.

As Grand Mistress of the Court, Mary Carolou keeps regular office hours at the Palace, attends to the Queen's correspondence, determines who shall be admitted to the Queen's presence, and acts as a channel for the delivery of messages from and to the Queen. She speaks English, French, and Greek with equal ease. She is goodlooking, though not beautiful, has brown eyes and dark brown hair that is turning gray. She is 5 feet 6 $\frac{1}{2}$  inches tall. In October 1958 she accompanied Queen Frederika, Princess Sophia and Prince Constantine when they visited the United States.

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FREDERIKA, Queen of Greece

GREECE

Queen Frederika, the wife of King Paul of Greece, was born April 18, 1917 at Blankenburg-in-the-Hartz, Germany, the daughter of the late Duke of Brunswick and Princess Victoria Louise of Prussia. Through her mother she is descended from Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany and Queen Victoria of England. As a young girl she was sent to school in England and later to college in Florence, Italy. In 1937 she met Prince Paul, then heir to the throne of Greece, and became engaged to him. They were married at Athens in 1938 and have three children; Princess Sophia, Crown Prince Constantine, and Princess Irene.

Although not of Greek blood, Queen Frederika has taken her position seriously and has won the allegiance of all classes in the country. She has great charm, wit, and intelligence and, while often simple and direct in manner, is conscious at all times of the responsibilities and prerogatives of her royal rank. She is 5 feet 7 inches tall, has blue eyes and curly chestnut hair, and is an accomplished sportswoman who enjoys skiing, riding, and sailing. Bilingual in German and English, she learned to speak Greek fluently after taking up her residence in Athens. As Queen, Frederika is the head of all Greek charitable societies and has devoted herself earnestly to her many welfare projects.

Queen Frederika is generally considered a more decisive character than her husband, King Paul, and has often taken the lead in forming palace policy. The Royal Family is not wealthy and lives in an unostentatious, frequently informal way. Queen Frederika drives around Athens in an MG and she and the King spend many hours in happy companionship with their teenage children. In 1953 King Paul and Queen Frederika made a state visit to the United States and in 1958 the Queen came again on an unofficial visit with her daughter Princess Sophia and Prince Constantine, the heir to the throne.

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FRONDISTIS, Athanassios (Lt. General)

GREECE

Lt. General Athanassios Frondistis, appointed Chief of the Greek General Staff in November 1959, is a competent though not outstanding career officer, known as a hard worker with the ability to get things done. He is strongly nationalistic and is in accord with the pro-American policy of his government. The General has a pleasing, thoughtful personality. He is said to prefer commanding troops to holding staff positions, chiefly because he is not interested in the political nuances that surround a staff job. He speaks French and Greek, but does not hear well in spite of a hearing aid that he wears in his left ear. In addition to his military training the General has also studied law.

Born September 24, 1900 at Thessaloniki, Frondistis studied at the University of Athens, the Military Academy and the Higher War College. He is married and has a daughter. His only son died in 1952.

General Frondistis has seen service in all the major Greek campaigns including the Korean War. In 1953 he was invited on an official visit to the United States to visit army installations. He was promoted to major general in December 1954 and to lieutenant general in July 1956. In May 1951 he was a member of IDEA, a secret anti-Communist officers' group, and was retired for his part in the events of that month, but was later recalled to active service. It is probable that he is still a member of IDEA.

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KANELLOPOULOS, Panayiotis

GREECE

Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, Deputy Prime Minister, has held over a dozen post-war posts, and was Prime Minister for about a month in 1945. A man of high caliber, respected for his idealism and honesty, Kanellopoulos is at heart more of a university professor and writer than a politician. He has never evolved any practical political program and has no substantial political following in Greece, being content to move along with the current stream and to serve under various Prime Ministers and in various cabinet posts. Although Kanellopoulos is not an efficient minister, he is personally one of the most likeable of all party leaders.

Born in 1902 at Patras, Kanellopoulos received a doctorate in law from the University of Athens and also studied at the Universities of Heidelberg and Paris. He speaks excellent English, French and German, besides his native Greek. He married Nitsa Poulakis, who has two sons by her first marriage. Both of these are American citizens and reside in the United States. After receiving considerable academic fame as a professor of sociology at the University of Athens Kanellopoulos entered politics in 1935. He has attended many international conferences, including sessions of the UN General Assembly and NATO, and has made several official visits to the United States.

Kanellopoulos is a gifted public speaker and author. Although a rather frail and sensitive man, he is also an energetic party worker. He is warmly pro-Western in his sympathies and has stood somewhat to the right politically since his university days. In 1954 he acquired a pilot's license and now frequently flies his own plane.

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KARAMANLIS, Constantine

GREECE

Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece and head of the National Radical Union (ERE) Party, has held office during a period of growing left-wing strength within Greece and tensions over the question of Cyprus. The forceful leadership exerted by Karamanlis in this difficult period has won wide approval from the electorate of Greece, the Palace, and the U.S. Embassy at Athens.

A self-made man who was formerly a tobacco industrialist and lawyer, Karamanlis entered the cabinet of Constantine Tsaldaris in 1946, and since that date has held cabinet post in many governments. Americans have found Karamanlis the type of man they like to work with. He concentrates on his task, drives himself without mercy, and has a reputation for accomplishing his objectives even though he is excitable, unpredictable, and has an irascible temperament. He has a quick mind and a high degree of native intelligence, but is handicapped by slight deafness. Stubborn, outspoken, and ambitious, he does not easily inspire people with love or admiration, but the Greek public gives him credit for accomplishing many improvements in the administration and development of the country.

Karamanlis was born February 23, 1907, at Proti, Macedonia. As the eldest of seven children Karamanlis seems to have accepted many family responsibilities at an early age. His schooling was continued, however, and he worked his way through the University of Athens, receiving a law degree there in 1930. In 1947 he went to London to study public administration. He speaks some English and French. In 1952 he married Amelia Kanellopoulos, the niece of deputy Prime Minister Panayiotis Kanellopoulos.

Karamanlis' foreign travel includes a trip to the United States in 1946 as a member of an economic mission, two months here in 1951 as a foreign leader grantee, and attendance at the 12th session of the UN General Assembly in 1957. He has also attended various international conferences.

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PAUL I, King of the Hellenes

GREECE

King Paul I ascended the throne of Greece on April 1, 1947 upon the death of his elder brother, King George II. King Paul, who is not of Greek blood, is the fifth monarch of the Danish Glucksburg dynasty, which has reigned in Greece since 1863. He is a conscientious, friendly man, very much interested in strengthening his small kingdom. He has accepted British and American guidance willingly and has sought to improve the welfare and standard of living of his subjects in many ways.

King Paul was born on December 14, 1901, at Athens, the third son of King Constantine and Queen Sophia, both of whom were relatives of the royal families of England, Germany, Russia, and Denmark. He was brought up in a rather informal way, took courses at universities in Greece, England and Italy, travelled in the United States, and became an accomplished aviator and sportsman. He is a devout communicant of the Greek Orthodox Church. On a trip to England in 1937 he became engaged to Princess Frederika of Brunswick-Luneburg. They were married at Athens in January 1938, and have three healthy and unusually attractive children: Sophia, Constantine, and Irene. Constantine is the Diadocos, or heir to the throne.

Greece is a constitutional monarchy, and although the role of the monarch is presumed to be non-political, King Paul, Queen Frederika and their coterie of palace advisers actually exert considerable influence on Greek political leaders. With the exception of the Communists, most Greeks today are devotedly loyal to their King. On the whole, King Paul has been a stabilizing factor in a small country where politics plays a disproportionate role, and his popularity with his subjects is high. He enjoys the support of the army, with which he has consistently maintained good relations, and has steadfastly urged continued close collaboration with Greece's western allies.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Biographic Information DivisionPROTOPAPADAKIS, AristidesGREECE

Aristides Protopapadakis Minister of Coordination in the Karamanlis cabinet formed May 17, 1958, was Minister of Defense from February 1956 until March 3, 1958. He is a marine architect and shipbuilder who has been a member of the Greek National Assembly (Vouli) from the Cyclades since 1932. In 1946 and again in 1948-1950 he served as Minister of Air, was Minister of Labor from 1947 to 1948, and Minister of Industry from 1952 to 1955. He is an able administrator with a good ministerial record. American advisers in Greece have found him intelligent, alert and a hard worker with a spirit of cooperation based on understanding and study rather than subservience or good nature. A stiff, serious man, with a strong sense of pride and dignity, he is a "hard bargainer" and resists what he considers to be "interference," but he is willing to discuss the reasons for his decisions and is open to argument if approached in a frank and friendly manner.

Protopapadakis was born at Athens, February 4, 1903, the son of Petros Protopapadakis, who, as a Populist member of the Gounaris cabinet, was one of those held responsible for the Asia Minor disaster and was executed in 1922. Protopapadakis continues to harbor bitterness against the old Liberal Party elements who participated in the 1922 events. He graduated from the Athens Polytechnic Institute in 1929 and later attended engineering schools in Berlin and France. He speaks fair English in addition to German, French, Italian and Greek. In 1935, after becoming a deputy, he was named Under Secretary of State for National Economy and for the Prime Minister's Office. Under the Metaxas regime he returned to shipbuilding in Piraeus from 1937 until 1940. He served as a reserve naval officer (constructor) at the beginning of World War II. During the German occupation he again worked as a marine architect and shipbuilder. He was not an active member of any resistance group, but apparently assisted in sabotage of the shipbuilding program, and in helping a number of persons escape to the Near East. Since the war he has served in a series of Populist and coalition governments. Initially a Populist, he joined the Stephanopoulos group in breaking away from that party in 1951, entered the Greek Rally upon its formation shortly afterwards, and is now a member of the National Radical Union (ERE). In December 1957 he attended the NATO Conference at Paris.

His wife, Lavria, described as cultured, intelligent, and charming, has lived in England and has traveled in the United States. They have two sons, Peter and Demetrius, born about 1931 and 1933 respectively.

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RODOPoulos, Konstantine

GRECE

Konstantine Rodopoulos, President of the Vouli (Greek Parliament) since 1952 and a former minister, is an experienced parliamentarian and an able master of procedure. Valuable politically to Prime Minister Karamanlis in negotiating and maneuvering legislation, he is a skillful fence mender and a good party man who gets along well with everyone. He is also a capable lawyer with a background of advanced legal study. He has always been most cooperative with and helpful to American officials. Socially, Rodopoulos makes an excellent impression and is a genial and witty conversationalist.

Rodopoulos, born in 1896 in Larissa, Thessaly, graduated from the University of Athens Law School, served in the army from 1916 to 1922, and then studied law at the Universities of Lausanne, Paris and Vienna. In 1924 he returned to Athens to practice law. From 1928 to 1932 he served abroad on several economic missions and was a Greek representative at the League of Nations in Geneva. In 1932 he was elected a deputy from Larissa and has been returned in all subsequent elections.

During the late 1930's Rodopoulos was engaged in private business in France and during the German occupation he continued with his law practice in Athens. He was appointed Minister for Northern Greece in November 1946 during the difficult early days of the guerrilla war, then later served as Minister of Health (January 1949 to January 1950) and Minister for Press and Information (September to November 1950). He was elected President of the Vouli in 1952. In February 1960 Rodopoulos visited the United States as a distinguished Greek participating in the Exchange of Persons Program. He speaks French, German, Greek and some English, but prefers to use an interpreter for English.

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SKEFERIS, Pericles

GREECE

Pericles Skeferis, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, is a seasoned career diplomat of seventy-six who seems much younger than his years would indicate. A gentleman of the old school, Skeferis is courteous, kindly, and conscientious; moreover he is able to draw on a vast store of information acquired in his various diplomatic posts. In the foreign ministry he is regarded as an expert on Soviet and Balkan affairs, and he has many close friends in the Turkish diplomatic corps. He is also interested in ecclesiastical affairs, and while Ambassador to Turkey from 1946 to 1950 was a close adviser of Athenagoras, the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church. Skeferis speaks French and Greek, but little English.

Born in 1884 at Preveza, Skeferis entered the foreign service in 1912. After holding posts in Constantinople, Moscow, Alexandria and Marseilles, he was appointed Minister to Tirana in 1935 and Minister to Budapest in 1940. During World War II he was the director general of the foreign office of the Greek Government in Exile, located in Cairo. From 1946 to 1950 he served as Ambassador to Turkey, and from 1950 to 1951 was chief of the Greek Liaison Service to the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). Skeferis reached the age of retirement from the foreign service at the end of his tour of duty as Ambassador to Turkey, but wished to be given further assignments and was glad to accept the position with UNSCOB. Since he handled his duties with UNSCOB in an able, highly acceptable manner, he was appointed Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs on May 3, 1956 and has held this latter position to date.

In 1920 Skeferis married Maria Koutoubi, a Greek from Izmir, Turkey. They have one daughter, Alexandra, born in 1923. The Ambassador is short and slim, modest about his attainments and his many decorations and honors. While Skeferis was in Alexandria from 1927 to 1932 he successfully prosecuted Greek narcotic smugglers, and while Greek Minister in Tirana he foresaw the Italian attack on Albania in April 1939 and notified the Greek Government of its imminence. The four years (1935-1939) that Skeferis spent in Albania are considered by diplomatic and political circles as a very successful chapter in his diplomatic life.

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TSATSOS, Constantine

GREECE

Minister to the Prime Minister, Constantine Tsatsos is one of the prominent members of the Liberal Party who defected to the National Radical Union (ERE) of Prime Minister Karamanlis shortly before the elections of 1956 and was rewarded by being appointed to the cabinet formed February 29, 1956. Both Mr. Tsatsos and his wife, the former Ioanna Seferiades, are influential intellectual leaders in Athenian society and have contributed to the cultural and literary life of Greece as well as to the political side. As Minister to the Prime Minister, Tsatsos acts for both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during their absence from Athens, and he has established most cordial relations with the American Embassy and USIA officials in Greece. He is distinguished and scholarly, thin, short and swarthy in appearance, quick in his movements and loquacious. It is believed that although he is excellent as a minister, he would not be forceful enough to be a Prime Minister. He is deeply and basically pro-Western in his sympathies.

Tsatsos was born in July 1899 at Athens, the brother of Themistocles Tsatsos, a former Minister of Justice. He and his wife have two grown daughters. He speaks English, French, German and Italian in addition to Greek, studied law at the University of Athens, and received an LL.B. from the University of Heidelberg in 1924. For many years he was a professor of Law at the University of Athens and has written a number of learned studies on various aspects of law and literature. After the liberation of Greece, Tsatsos entered the government as Minister of the Interior in the Voulgaris cabinet of 1945; became Minister of Press and Information in the short-lived Kanellopoulos cabinet of November 1945; was Minister of Education from January 1949 to January 6, 1950; and was Under Secretary of Coordination with ministerial rank from December 1950 to April 1951. In 1952 he came to the United States on a Leader Grant. He was appointed Minister to the Prime Minister on February 29, 1956, and was reappointed when the second Karamanlis cabinet was formed on May 17, 1958.

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